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Abstract
Writing about developments in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (“EMU”) at this
juncture in time is a bold endeavour and a hazardous undertaking. ‘Bold’ because the devel-
opments are manifold, highly technical in nature and deeply contested among the players and
the public—between Greeks and Germans, between mainstream political parties and (emerging)
parties taking a different view, and between politicians and the electorate. ‘Hazardous’ as devel-
opments go so fast that these lines shall be partially outdated the moment they appear in published
form. And yet, there is a need to explore and explain. That’s what this contribution seeks to do: to
explore and explain the developments in EMU law. An occasional aside from the legal approach
will be undertaken to broaden the perspective.
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INTRODUCTION 
A. A Bold and Hazardous Undertaking 
Writing about developments in Europe’s Economic and 
Monetary Union (“EMU”) at this juncture in time is a bold endeavour 
and a hazardous undertaking. ‘Bold’ because the developments are 
manifold, highly technical in nature and deeply contested among the 
players and the public—between Greeks and Germans, between 
mainstream political parties and (emerging) parties taking a different 
view, and between politicians and the electorate. ‘Hazardous’ as 
developments go so fast that these lines shall be partially outdated the 
moment they appear in published form. And yet, there is a need to 
explore and explain. That’s what this contribution seeks to do: to 
explore and explain the developments in EMU law. An occasional 
aside from the legal approach will be undertaken to broaden the 
perspective. 
B. The European Union and the Euro Area in a Nutshell 
A few words at the outset about the stage on which the EMU 
players act. The 28-nation European Union (“EU”) defies classical 
definitions: it is neither a single State nor a pure federation of States. 
Yet, it has many of the attributes of the latter. The Member States 
have ceded sovereignty in areas of joint policy-making to the Union, 
sometimes giving exclusive powers to the EU (inter alia, trade 
policy,1 competition rules for the internal market,2 and monetary 
policy for the States that use the euro),3 often retaining powers and 
sharing them with the Union (again, without intending to be complete, 
internal market, social policy, environmental protection, transport, 
issues of ‘freedom, and security and justice’). Economic policy is 
another shared competence.4 In areas of internal competence, the 
Union also has external competence, i.e., is exclusively competent to 
                                                            
1. The area of the customs union and the common commercial policy. Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 3, March 30, 2010 (1)(a), 
(e), 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 51. 
2. TFEU art. 3(1)(b). 
3. TFEU art. 3(1)(c). 
4. TFEU art. 5. 
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enter into international agreements.5 A Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (“CSFP”) seeks to align the foreign policies of the Member 
States. The EU works on the basis of attribution of competences: 
where no competence has been conferred6—even ‘just’ to harmonise 
national law or practices—the EU may not act. Any transgression 
would be ultra vires. Since its inception,7 a part of litigation before 
the Union’s top court is about the exact limits of the Union’s powers, 
and the legal basis on which actions have been adopted.  
This brings us to the other likeness of the Union with a 
federation: joint bodies have been established to govern the EU. 
Legislative power is vested in the Council of Ministers, each from 
every Member State (“Council”), acting in concert with the European 
Parliament (“EP”) on the initiative of the European Commission. The 
Commission is executive body8 and guardian of the Treaties: it 
oversees conformity of action by the Member States with Union law.9 
The Court of Justice, consisting of a General Court and the Court of 
Justice,10 oversees the application of the law, often in collaboration 
with national courts which may (if the highest instance: must) refer 
questions of EU law to the Luxembourg-based judges for a 
preliminary ruling, an incident in their own national proceedings.11 
The Court of Auditors oversees finances. Overall direction to the 
Union is given by the Heads of State or Government and the President 
of the Commission gathered in the European Council.12 This 
                                                            
5.  TFEU art. 3(2) and case law, notably AETR judgment of 31 March 1970 in Case 
22/70 (Commission vs. Council) and subsequent cases. 
6. Consolidated Treaty of the European Union art. 5, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 
13, 17 [hereinafter TEU]. 
7. References are to the (European) Union, acknowledging that the international legal 
person this names stands for, used to be known as the European Economic Community (EEC), 
later: European Community (EC), and that ‘European Union’ was the name given between the 
Maastricht (signed 7 February 1992, entry into force 1 November 1993) and Lisbon Treaties 
(signed 13 December 2007, entry into force 1 January 2009) to the EC plus the 
intergovernmental cooperation in ‘internal’ (justice et cetera) and ‘external’ (foreign policy) 
affairs. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU gained legal personality. 
8. Its Vice-President is also the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and heads the EU’s External Action Service. 
9. The European Central Bank performs a similar function in respect of the National 
Central Banks. Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank art. 35.6.  
10. And a Civil Service Tribunal to settle disputes with EU civil servants. 
11. TFEU art. 267. 
12. TEU art. 15(5) & (6). 
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institution is chaired by a permanent President.13 The European 
Central Bank (“ECB”) has been established to independently define 
and conduct the monetary policy of the Union, with maintaining price 
stability as its primary objective.14 It does so in conjunction with the 
National Central Banks (“NCBs”) of the Member States whose 
currency is the euro (participating Member States). The ECB and the 
NCBs constitute the European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”). 
To distinguish between the ESCB serving the 28-nation Union and its 
components acting as the monetary authority for the euro area, the 
ECB and the NCBs of the States that have adopted the single currency 
have been named: the Eurosystem.15  
All Member States are supposed to adopt the single currency, 
which, as of 1999, has replaced the former national currencies,16 with 
two exceptions: the United Kingdom and Denmark. These two States 
negotiated an ‘opt-out’ in Maastricht. The other Member States are 
legally required to fulfil the criteria for the adoption of the euro.17 
Before they pass these conditions for admission to the eurozone, they 
are ‘Member States with a derogation.’ Adoption of the single 
currency is a one-way street, an irreversible process, as the Protocol 
on the transition to EMU18 adopted in Maastricht19 and repealed in 
Lisbon20 made clear. The only legal means to abandon the single 
                                                            
13. The (ordinary, ministerial) Council configurations are chaired by a Member State, on 
a rotating basis. 
14. TFEU art. 127(1). This provision adds: “Without prejudice to the objective of price 
stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the 
Treaty on European Union.” 
15. TFEU art. 282(1). 
16. Subsequently, for Greece (2001), Slovenia (2007), Cyprus and Malta (2008), 
Slovakia (2009) Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014), and Lithuania (2015).  
17. By intentionally not fulfilling the convergence criteria, Sweden has manoeuvred 
itself into a de facto opt-out position; a second (the first was in 2003) referendum on adoption 
of the euro should pave the way for adoption of the single currency. 
18. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 
Protocol on the transition to the third stage of economic and monetary Union, at 87. (“THE 
HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, Declare the irreversible character of the Community's 
movement to the third stage of economic and monetary union by signing the new Treaty 
provisions on economic and monetary union . . . .”). 
19. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 
[hereinafter Maastricht TEU]. 
20. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 36) 1 [hereinafter Treaty 
of Lisbon]. The Lisbon Reform Treaty inserted the main provisions of the European 
Constitution (2004, never ratified whilst defeated in referendums in France and the 
Netherlands) into the two founding treaties, the Treaty of Rome (1957), since named: Treaty 
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currency is secession from the Union,21 for which Article 50 TEU 
provides a basic mechanism. Institutionally, the euro area is 
embedded in the EU, although ‘institutional specification’ is taking 
place, with the Euro Group of Finance Ministers from the 
participating Member States already recognised in the TFEU.22 
Although this summary of the EU’s make-up does not, by far, do 
justice to the complexity of the Union, it is included to set the stage 
for the bewildering array of actions, and their qualification, that 
follow. As participants in the discussions about ‘Grexit,’ ‘deepening’ 
EMU and unconventional monetary policy measures often use 
undefined terms, a recall of basic features of the EU serves a well-
informed debate. 
C. Outline of the Article 
This Article discusses the adaptation of economic governance of 
the EU in Part I, unconventional monetary policy measures in Part II, 
the main features of ‘banking union’ in Part III, other measures 
addressing the crisis (the ‘bail-out’ funds) in Part IV, and finally the 
judicial challenges to the crisis response in Part V. 
I. ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE OF THE EU  
A. ‘Economic Union’ Based on Free Markets’ Disciplining Players 
The effects of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 that led to the 
Great Recession were felt worldwide, and became particularly acute 
in Europe as of 2010. Then, the crisis evolved in a debt crisis that 
showed the vulnerability of EMU and led to financial markets 
questioning the euro’s permanence. EMU had been established on the 
basis of the 1980s free-market thinking. Markets would discipline 
                                                                                                                                     
on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) and the Treaty on European Union 
(“TEU”). TFEU and TEU, together with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, form the basic 
sources of EU law (‘primary law’). ‘Lisbon’ is not a self-standing treaty.  
21. On withdrawal from the Eurozone, see CHARLES PROCTOR, MANN ON THE LEGAL 
ASPECT OF MONEY 771–92 (6th ed. 2005); Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion 
from the EU and EMU: Some Reflections, (ECB Legal Working Paper Series No. 10, 
December 2009), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp10.pdf. 
22. TFEU Protocol no. 14 on the Euro Group. The Euro group has a permanent chair, 
first Luxembourg Prime Minister and Finance Minister, current European Commission 
President Jean Claude Juncker (2005-2013), since 2013 Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen 
Dijsselbloem. 
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governments towards prudent budgetary behaviour, necessary to 
avoid undermining a single currency in a bloc whose governments 
would continue to sit at the levers of economic policy, only monetary 
policy being made ‘single.’ Markets would also determine the 
exchange rate of the single currency: this rate would be the outcome 
of economic policies, as assessed by the markets. What weak 
mechanisms were in place for policy makers to influence the 
exchange rate were more or less abdicated by the European Council at 
the inception of EMU.23 On this basis, the Treaty provisions provide 
for certain principles24 (including the free market principle25), 
prohibitions (the prohibition of monetary financing by central banks,26 
and of privileged market access for the public sector to the financial 
sector,27 and the ‘no bail-out’ clause28), procedures for coordination: 
the multilateral surveillance procedure,29 and the excessive deficit 
procedure (“EDP”).30 Only the last of these procedures concerns more 
than mere coordination and includes the option of sanctions against a 
deviant Member State.31  
B. Stability and Growth Pact as a Supplement to the EDP 
Just ahead of the transition to currency union, the Member States 
agreed on the toughening up of the EDP: the Stability and Growth 
                                                            
23. Resolution of the European Council of 13 December 1997 on economic policy 
coordination in stage 3 of EMU and on Treaty Articles 109 and 109b of the EC Treaty, [now: 
Articles 138 and 219, and 284, respectively, TFEU] 1998 O.J. (C 35) 1. 
24. EMU is bound by the guiding principles of stable prices, sound and sustainable 
public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments. TFEU, art. 
119(3) TFEU. See also TEU art. 3 for the Union’s objectives and values. 
25. TFEU art. 119(1) & (2). The ESCB is subject to this principle, as well. TFEU art. 
127(1). 
26. TFEU art. 123. 
27. TFEU art. 124. 
28. TFEU art. 125. 
29. TFEU art. 121. 
30. TFEU art. 126. Reference is made to this author’s writing on the pre-crisis economic 
union provisions. See René Smits, The Impact Of EMU Law on National Budgetary Freedom: 
an Inquiry into the Limits of State Sovereignty in Economic Policy Matters, in INTERFACE 
BETWEEN EU LAW AND NATIONAL LAW (D. Obradovic and N. Lavranos eds.); University of 
Amsterdam, The Hogendorp Papers 7, 2006, 131–68; see also René Smits, Some Reflections 
on Economic Policy, in LEGAL ISSUES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 34(1), 5–25 (Kluwer Law 
Int’l ed., 2007). 
31. Of the euro area: Member States with a derogation or an opt-out are not subject to 
such sanctions. Space does not permit giving attention to the specific situation of the United 
Kingdom under the EMU law provisions. See Protocol No. 15 on Certain Provisions Relating 
to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
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Pact was adopted in Amsterdam in 1997. It mainly consists of a 
resolution of the European Council, and two regulations (1466/9732 
and 1467/9733) that filled in the discretionary powers of the 
Commission and the Ecofin Council under the Treaty. At the very 
first instance when the SGP was supposed to show ‘bite,’ the two 
main Member States refused to be subjected to its discipline. The 
stand-off with France and Germany led to a court case between the 
Commission and the Council in which the limits of the first to compel 
the latter to proceed were confirmed.34 Subsequently, the SGP was 
amended and, by and large, weakened.35 Had there, previously, been a 
Community-wide engagement to achieve, over time, budgetary 
balance (well beyond the Treaty-imposed criteria of a budget deficit 
below 3% of GDP and public debt below 60% of GDP36), now each 
Member State was to follow its own, ‘country-specific’ medium-term 
budgetary objective (“MTBO”). Longer periods of adjustment were 
adopted and structural reform efforts undertaken by the Member 
States were to be taken into consideration when applying the 
budgetary criteria. On the other hand, the 2005 amendments brought 
some strengthening of the SGP, as well. Notably, Member States 
were supposed to take quantifiable steps towards their MTBO, with a 
0.5% of GDP benchmark for annual improvements in their budgetary 
situation if not yet compliant, and needed to give reasons for 
deviations from the MTBO. Many Member States failed to abide by 
even these less strict rules.37 
                                                            
32. Council Regulation EC No. 1466/97 on the Strengthening of the Surveillance of 
Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies, 1997 O.J. L 
209/1, as amended. 
33. Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 on Speeding Up and Clarifying the Implementation of 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 6, as amended. 
34. C-27/04 Commission vs. Council, [2004] E.C.R. I-06649. 
35. Council Regulation 1055/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 174) 1 (EC); Council Regulation 
1056/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 174) 5 (EC). These amendments were preceded by a Council Report 
to the European Council, Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, 21 
March 2005, available at http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/03/
21stab/stab.pdf. 
36. Note that these criteria are the quantitative limits woven into qualitative language 
that leaves discretion to the political authorities to determine whether a budgetary situation is 
unsustainable. This was to be an assessment by the politically responsible institutions, not by 
the judiciary: TFEU Article 126(10) excludes Court competence concerning compliance with 
the EDP’s budgetary rules. 
37. Of the 28 Member States, only three (Estonia, Luxembourg and Sweden) have never 
had an excessive deficit; several have been in the EDP procedure for many years (Germany, 
Spain, Cyprus: 8; Portugal, UK: 10; France, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Poland: 11 years). See the 
presentation on economic governance that Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker gave 
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C. Crisis Reveals Weakness of Governance Arrangements 
Markets that were supposed to have disciplined, failed to do so. 
During EMU’s first ten years, governments could borrow on almost 
equal terms, with the ‘spread’ between interest rates Germany needed 
to pay and those exacted from Greece, a few basis points only. With 
interest rates set by the ECB for the entire euro area, the level may 
have been unsuitable for its constituent parts. As the authors of the 
Report of the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group38 declared: ‘Rather 
than being “one size fits all,” the ECB’s monetary policy was “one 
size fits none.’ The ECB’s monetary policy had adverse and even 
self-enforcing pro-cyclical effects in those Member States whose 
economic fundamentals were not in line with the euro area average. 
And this, although the ECB did exactly what was required of it: ‘the 
ECB ran the right monetary policy for a country that did not exist.’ 
This may have led to real estate bubbles in Spain and Ireland, and 
overconsumption in Portugal and Greece. It certainly did nothing to 
prevent a—second39—major aberration of the public finances of 
Greece which became public at the end of 2010. Financial markets 
panicked, and credit rating agencies (“CRAs”) accelerated an 
irrational widening of the ‘spread.’ Had, before, any risk been 
considered absent, now markets acted as if Greece and other 
‘peripheral’ States were the world’s worst debtors and requested 
excessive returns. Being denied market access, other Member States 
and the Union stepped in. This led to the establishment of ‘bail-out’ 
funds, discussed in Part IV below. Not until ECB President Mario 
Draghi stated that ‘within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do 
whatever it takes to preserve the euro,’40 did a measure of calm return 
                                                                                                                                     
before the 12 February 2015 European Council meeting, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
priorities/docs/economic-governance-presentation_en.pdf. 
38. See generally HENRIK ENDERLEIN ET AL., COMPLETING THE EURO A ROAD MAP 
TOWARDS FISCAL UNION IN EUROPE (2012), available at http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/
completingtheeuroreportpadoa-schioppagroupnejune2012.pdf? pdf=ok. 
39. In 2004, the Commission opened in an infringement procedure against Greece at the 
European Court of Justice for serious fraud in budgetary statistics. See press release 
IP/04/1431, Commission reports on Greek statistics, starts infringement procedure, 1 Dec. 
2004. This case was not pursued. For an overview of Greek statistics, see Eurostat’s 2010 
Report: Report on Greek government deficit and debt statistics, COM(2010) 1 final, (Jan. 8, 
2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/6404656/
COM_2010_report_greek/c8523cfa-d3c1-4954-8ea1-64bb11e59b3a.  
40. Verbatim of the remarks made by Mario Draghi, Speech by Mario Draghi, President 
of the European Central Bank at the Global Investment Conference in London, 26 July 2012, 
available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html. 
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to the markets, only to be disturbed again when, early in 2015, a new 
Greek Government was elected that intended to un-do the strict 
constraints of conditionality imposed by the EU and the International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF”).  
The crisis had also exposed the weak ‘economic’ underpinning 
of the currency union. Policy makers had assumed that national 
divergences would fade away in the internal market with a single 
currency, making the intra-Union balance of payments irrelevant. 
Deviating economic developments and an unabated continuation of 
perceptions of States as being the main actors proved them wrong. 
The disconcerted response to the financial crisis in October 2008, 
when Member States took different approaches instead of acting in 
close harmony to face market panic and economic turmoil, 
contributed to the perception of States remaining in charge of 
economic developments. Worse even, financial markets disintegrated 
quickly: national solutions were sought for problems at banks, 
supervisors didn’t communicate or coordinate properly, and banks 
retreated to their home ‘turf,’ encouraged by their central banks and 
supervisors. ‘Banking union,’ outlined in Part III below, was to be the 
answer to this. The currency union proved less integrated than 
assumed, when the first major crisis struck. Addressing weaknesses in 
economic policy coordination was the primary task the EU legislator 
set itself. 
D. Major Reconstruction: ‘Six-pack’ and ‘Two-pack’ 
In order to remedy economic governance weaknesses, six 
legislative proposals were introduced and adopted in record time. 
Two legal acts amend the SGP regulations41 and, thus, concern 
budgetary policy. So does a directive requiring Member States to 
amend their budgetary frameworks.42 One legal act introduces a new 
                                                            
41. Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies; Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 33. 
42. Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on Requirements for Budgetary 
Frameworks of the Member States, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 41. 
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system of monitoring, and keeping in check, economic imbalances.43 
Two legal acts impose stricter enforcement of budgetary44 and general 
imbalances monitoring45 on euro area Member States. An in-depth 
discussion of these reforms is beyond the scope of this Article, which 
will focus on the major elements of a substantive and institutional 
nature.  
1. ‘Six-pack’ Strengthening of the SGP: Material Norms 
Since the SGP’s inception, Member States have had to submit 
annual convergence (for the ‘outs,’ i.e., the States with a derogation 
or opt-out) or stability (for the ‘ins’) programmes in which they set 
out the path towards sustainable public finances.46 The ‘six-pack’ 
reinforcement of the SGP seeks to ensure that coherent, and aligned, 
stability and convergence programmes are submitted, that are made 
public. Each Member State continues to pursue its own MTBO but 
under stricter conditions, both in respect of the budget deficit and the 
debt level. The emphasis on debt is novel: although the budget 
criteria47 address both deficit and debt, the latter had in practice been 
neglected in addressing sound public finances. On debt, it is now 
required that revenue windfalls (revenues in excess of what can 
normally be expected from economic growth) are to be allocated to 
debt reduction and, if public debt exceeds 60% of GDP, annual steps 
towards sustainable debt levels are to be in excess of 0.5% GDP.48  
2. ‘Six-pack’ Strengthening of the SGP: Institutional Changes 
Institutionally, the amendments include the of the national 
budgetary process into a ‘European Semester for Economic Policy 
Coordination,’49 a sequence of actions starting in January with 
                                                            
43. Regulation EU No. 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on the Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, 2011 O.J. 
(L 306) 25. See under ‘Excessive Imbalances Procedure’ below. 
44. Regulation EU No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on the Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in the euro area, 
2011 O.J. (L 306) 1. 
45. Regulation EU No. 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on Enforcement Measures to Correct Excessive Macroeconomic Imbalances 
in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 8. See under ‘Excessive Imbalances Procedure’ below. 
46. In addition, Member States need to submit ‘National reform Programmes’ on how to 
support the EU strategy for growth and jobs (‘Europe 2020’).  
47. TFEU art. 126(2)(a) & (b). 
48. Regulation 1466/97, as amended by Regulation 1175/2011, supra note 41, art. 5(1). 
49. Id. at art. 2-a. 
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Commission forecasts for economic growth, followed by the adoption 
of combined Broad Economic Policy Guidelines50 and Employment 
Guidelines,51 so as to establish a Union-wide backdrop for the 
submission, by end-April, of national plans on public finances and 
their assessment, resulting in ‘country-specific’52 recommendations 
(“CSRs”) in July.53 The Commission’s role has been strengthened in 
that it shall (instead of: ‘can,’ as in the past) give an early warning in 
case of a significant observed deviation from the adjustment path 
towards the MTBO. Also, many54 (not all55) Ecofin Council decisions 
on budgetary balance are taken by ‘reverse Qualified Majority 
Voting’ (“QMV”), a system under which the Commission’s 
recommendation for a Council legal act is deemed to be adopted 
unless the Council rejects it by simple majority. The introduction of 
‘Economic Dialogue’ on economic policy, involving the European 
Parliament more closely with what hitherto had been largely an affair 
for ministers and the Commission,56 is another institutional novelty.  
                                                            
50. Council Recommendation of 13 July 2010 on Broad Guidelines for the Economic 
Policies of the Member States and of the Union, 2010 O.J. L 191/28. Adopted pursuant to 
Article 121(2) TFEU. See also, the euro area’s ‘country-specific recommendation’ on 
Implementing the BEPGs: Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the Implementation of 
the Broad Guidelines for the Economic Policies of the Member States Whose Currency is the 
Euro 2014 O.J. (C 247) 141. 
51. Council Decision 2010/707/EU on Guidelines for the Employment Policies of the 
Member States, 2010 O.J. (L 308) 46. This was adopted pursuant to TFEU art. 148(2). 
52. I would prefer to term these: ‘State-specific’, emphasising the nature of nations as 
Member States of the EU. 
53. For an overview of Council recommendations in respect of each Member State 
(National Reform Plans, stability/convergence plans) see Council Recommendation of 8 July 
2014 on the Implementation of the Broad Guidelines for the Economic Policies of the Member 
States whose Currency is the Euro, 2014 O.J. (C 247) 141-43. 
54. See Council Regulation 1466/97, arts. 6(2) and 10(2), consolidated text after 2011 
amendment in 2011 O.J., available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
?qid=1432563194593&uri=CELEX:01997R1466-20111213. For decision-making in respect 
of participating Member States see Regulation 1173/2011 of the European Union Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the Effective Enforcement of Budgetary 
Surveillance in the Euro Area, arts. 4(2), 5(2) and 6, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 1, 4-5 (EU) (stating 
respectively interest-bearing deposits, non-interest-bearing deposits and fines). 
55. Notably, the decisions on whether an excessive deficit exists (TFEU art. 126(6)), on 
whether effective action has been undertaken (TFEU art. 126(8)) and to give notice to the 
deviant Member State (TFEU art. 126(9)) are taken by normal QMV. Please, note that—in 
respect of participating Member States—only the other euro area States take part in the vote 
(TFEU art. 139(4)). For all 28 States an exclusion to vote on their own matters applies in 
respect of the EDP (TFEU art. 126(13)). 
56. Article 2-ab Regulation 1466/97, as lastly amended by Regulation 1175/2011, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1432563194593&uri=
CELEX:01997R1466-20111213; Article 2a Regulation 1467/97, as lastly amended by 
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3. Increased Strictness 
The strictness of the SGP has been increased, by requiring public 
and aligned national programmes, based on the most likely, 
independently-made economic forecasts,57 through the requirement of 
professional independence of national statistical authorities,58 through 
publicity of remedial action,59 and by a succession of sanctions that 
can be imposed on euro area Member States. Early in the monitoring 
process, an interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% of the preceding year’s 
GDP is to be imposed on a participating Member State that has failed 
to take action in response to an Ecofin Council recommendation.60 A 
non-interest-bearing deposit of equal size shall be imposed on a 
Eurozone State that the Council has identified, under Article 126(6) 
TFEU, as having an excessive deficit and that has already been the 
subject of the sanction of a non-interest-bearing deposit or, where the 
Commission identifies ‘particularly serious non-compliance’ with the 
SGP.61 A fine of equal size shall be imposed on a State using the euro 
about which the Council has decided, pursuant to Article 126(8) 
TFEU, that it failed to take effective action to correct the excessive 
                                                                                                                                     
Regulation 1177/2011, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=
1432568381107&uri=CELEX:01997R1467-20111213; Article 3 Regulation 1173/2011. See, 
also, Article 15 Regulation 473/2013, and Article 18 Regulation 472/2013. Also, the Excessive 
Imbalances Procedure (EIP) regulations include provisions on economic dialogue (Article 14 
Regulation 1176/2011; Article 6 Regulation 1174/2011). 
57. Articles 3(2a) [stability programmes] and 7 (2a) [convergence programmes] 
Regulation 1466/97, as amended by Regulation 1175/2011. 
58. Article 10a Regulation 1466/97, as amended by Regulation 1175/2011. 
59. A State that has been given a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU needs to make public 
its report to the Council and the Commission on its response: Article 5(1a) Regulation 
1467/97, as amended by Regulation 1177/2011. 
60. Regulation 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on the Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in the Euro Area, art. 
4, 2011 O.J. (L306) 1, 4 (EU). Note that a recommendation ‘shall’ give rise to a sanction if not 
followed up. Recommendations are non-binding, see TFEU art. 288. Moreover, this kind of 
recommendation is issued in the context of the multilateral surveillance procedure, notably on 
the basis of TFEU art. 121(4), which doesn’t foresee any sanctions. The legal basis must be 
found in a combination of TFEU art. 121(6), allowing the EU legislature to adopt detailed 
rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure, and TFEU art. 136, which provides a 
competence to enact euro area-specific secondary law ‘to strengthen the coordination and 
surveillance of budgetary discipline,’ and to adopt euro area-specific economic policy 
guidelines. 
61. See Regulation 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on the Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in the Euro Area, art. 
5, 2011 O.J. (L306) 1, 4 (EU). Note that a sanction follows in a phase of the step-by-step 
procedure of TFEU art. 126 for which the Treaty does not yet provide for a sanction. For the 
legal basis, see supra note 60. 
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deficit.62 These sanctions are mandatory (‘shall’). Their imposition 
follows the reverse QMV procedure.63 Further sanctions, based on 
Regulation 1467, as amended, remain: a fine, as a rule, is to be 
imposed,64 equal to 0.2% of GDP plus a variable component, related 
to the size of the offense against the budgetary rules.65 Whereas, 
previously, interest and fines were supposed to be distributed among 
participating Member States without an excessive deficit in 
proportion to their share in total GNP of eligible Member States, 
nowadays, fines are to be channelled into the European Stability 
Mechanism (“ESM”), the permanent bail-out fund.66 And this is not 
the end of the punitive measures that can be adopted: the Commission 
has been given similar investigative powers against manipulation of 
statistics as it has in the context of the enforcement of competition 
rules, with the Council obtaining powers to impose sanctions that are 
‘effective, dissuasive and proportionate to the nature, seriousness and 
duration of the misrepresentation’ of data submitted in the context of 
the multilateral surveillance procedure or the EDP ‘intentionally or by 
serious negligence.’67 Also, the Commission may make a Member 
State subject to ‘enhanced surveillance’; the dialogue that the Union’s 
executive is to entertain with Member State authorities then evolves 
into on-site missions, together with the European Central Bank. The 
relevant provision68 was the first codification of the ‘troika.’69 More 
were to follow in the ‘two-pack.’ 
                                                            
62. See Regulation 1173/2011, art. 6, 2011 O.J. (L306) 1, 5 (EU). Note, again, that a 
sanction follows in a phase of the procedure of TFEU art. 126 for which the Treaty does not 
yet provide for a sanction. For the legal basis, see supra note 60. 
63. Id. arts. 4(2), 5(2) and 6(2). The Commission may recommend to the Council that it 
reduce or cancel the pecuniary measure, either at a reasoned request of the Member State, 
submitted within ten days of its adoption, or—only in the case of an non-interest-bearing 
deposit or a fine—‘on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances’ (Id. arts. 4(4), 5(4) and 
6(4)). 
64. Articles 6(2) and 11 Regulation 1467/97, as amended by Regulation 1177/2011. 
Consolidated version in the OJ available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?qid=1432568381107&uri=CELEX:01997R1467-20111213. 
65. Article 12 Regulation 1467/97, as amended by Regulation 1177/2011. Individual 
successive sanctions may not exceed 0.5% of the deviant State’s GDP. 
66. Article 16 Regulation 1467/97, as amended by Regulation 1177/2011. 
67. Article 8 Regulation 1173/2011. 
68. Article 10a Regulation 1467/97, as amended by Regulation 1177/2011. 
69. The term for the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF jointly agreeing the 
conditionality for lending to Member States in distress, and overseeing adherence to these 
conditions. Note that the Advocate General, in his Opinion in the pending court case on OMT 
(Case C-62/14, Gauweiler) proposes that the ECB refrain from actively participating in 
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4. ‘Two-pack’ Innovations 
This second set of laws was proposed even before the entry into 
force of the ‘six-pack’70 (December 13, 2011) and entered into force 
on May 30, 2013.  
E. Brussels’ Budget Oversight 
The first of these legal acts reinforces budgetary discipline and 
coherence with general economic-policy coordination.71 To that end, 
it establishes a common budgetary timeline for participating Member 
States to synchronise key steps in national budget preparations,72 and 
requires independent bodies at State levels that apply ‘numerical 
fiscal rules’ and can trigger the activation of correction mechanisms 
when these rules are in danger of being disrespected.73 A procedure 
for submission of draft budgets,74 and for their assessment by the 
Commission,75 is introduced. In a possible prelude to joint debt 
issuance, euro area Member States are to report to the Commission 
and the Eurogroup their debt issuance plans.76 The correction of an 
excessive budgetary deficit is strengthened by the requirement for 
States established to be in excessive deficit, to submit ‘economic 
partnership plans.’ These set out the policy measures and structural 
reforms ‘to ensure an effective and lasting correction’ of the excessive 
deficit. They are monitored by the Council and the Commission. Each 
Eurozone State subject to an Article 126(6) TFEU-decision77 needs to 
                                                                                                                                     
economic policy prescription and oversight when putting OMT in effect, thus signalling an end 
to its troika role. 
70. Both legal acts of the ‘twin-pack’ only apply to euro area Member States. See 
Regulation 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the 
Strengthening of Economic and Budgetary Surveillance of Member of Member States in the 
Euro Area Experiencing or Threatened with Serious Difficulties with Respect to their 
Financial Stability, art. 1(3), 2013 O.J. (L 140) 1, 3 (EU); Regulation 473/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on Common Provisions for 
Monitoring and Assessing Draft Budgetary Plans and Ensuring the Correction of Excessive 
Deficit of the Member States in the Euro Area, art. 1(3), 2013 O.J. (L140) 11, 16 (EU). 
71. See Regulation 473/2013, art. 3, 2013 O.J. (L 140) 11, 17 (EU). 
72. Id. art. 4, at 17. 
73. Id. art. 5, at 18.  
74. Id. art. 6, at 18. Remember that, under the SGP and the ‘2020’ programme, Member 
States need to submit stability (‘ins’) or convergence (‘outs’) programmes, and National 
Reform Programs. The ‘two-pack’ goes much further than this, for Member States whose 
currency is the euro. 
75. Id. art. 7, at 19.  
76. Id. art. 8, at 20.  
77. By which the Ecofin Council establishes that there is an excessive deficit. 
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present such a programme, and shall be made subject to additional 
reporting requirements to the Commission. Such requirements include 
an assessment of the execution of the budget, extending to contingent 
liabilities with large impacts on the public budget.78 An independent 
audit of the accounts of the public sector may be required.79  
F. Enhanced Surveillance for Euro Area States in Severe Difficulties 
If all of this doesn’t go far enough, the second of the ‘two-pack’ 
legal acts80 provides for incisive monitoring of a euro area Member 
State whose serious difficulties with financial stability or public 
finances threaten to have spill-over effects to the rest of the euro area, 
or that have requested or received financial assistance.81 These States 
come under ‘enhanced surveillance.’82 This requires the State 
concerned to adopt measures to address the sources of its problems. 
Even if this State were not to experience an excessive deficit, its 
budgetary situation is closely monitored and it is to report on, and 
stress-test, the soundness of its financial system. Regular review 
missions will descend on this Member State to check on progress in 
implementing the measures it needs to take. If the review mission 
concludes that further measures are needed, and the State’s situation 
‘has significant adverse effects on the financial stability of the euro 
area or its Member States,’ the Council may recommend this State to 
adopt ‘precautionary corrective measures.’ Alternatively, an 
economic adjustment programme83 may be recommended. Such a 
programme takes the place of an economic partnership programme. 
This involves extensive monitoring by a trio: Commission, ECB, and 
IMF. Post-programme surveillance continues as long as a minimum 
of 75% of the financial assistance received has not been repaid.84 This 
second legal act amounts to a codification of practice evolved in 
                                                            
78. Think of a blanket guarantee for the financial sector (Ireland) or guarantees for 
specific banks (almost all Member States), or the requirement to provide additional funding to 
the ESM (Articles 8(4) and 25(2) ESM Treaty). 
79. Regulation 473/2013, art. 10, 2013 O.J. (L 140) 21. 
80. Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 20 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the 
euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial 
stability, 2013 O.J. (L 140) 1. 
81. Id. arts. 1(1) & 2. 
82. Id. art. 3. 
83. Id. art. 7. 
84. Id. art. 14. 
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respect of the ‘peripheral’ Member States that had received financial 
assistance. 
G. Out-of-Legal-Bounds: ‘Fiscal Compact’ 
On top of the Union legal acts adopted, a separate international 
treaty has been agreed on fiscal discipline. It copies major elements of 
the legislative package, and contains institutional provisions on 
economic governance. The ‘Fiscal Compact’ Treaty, or Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (“TSCG”),85 was initiated while the ‘six-pack’ was 
still in the legislative stage. Ratification of the TSCG is a condition 
for the granting of financial assistance under the ESM. Compliance 
with its crucial Article 3(2) is a further condition for financial 
assistance. This provision requires the contracting parties86 to adopt in 
national law, preferably of a constitutional status, a balanced-budget 
rule, with automatic correction mechanisms triggered in case of 
deviation. In describing the balanced budget rule, the TSCG refers to 
the language of the SGP and the ‘six-pack.’ Further rules include the 
reduction, by one-twentieth per year as a benchmark, of public debt in 
excess of the reference value of 60% of GDP,87 a budgetary and 
economic partnership programme for parties in excessive deficit,88 
and ex ante reporting on debt issuance to the Council and the 
Commission.89  
Apart from incisive undertakings on budgetary soundness, the 
TSCG introduces institutional novelties. The signatories ‘commit to 
supporting the proposals or recommendations submitted by the 
European Commission where it considers that a Member State of the 
European Union whose currency is the euro is in breach of the deficit 
criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure,’ at least 
if a qualified majority does not object to what the Commission puts 
forward.90 An intriguing and complex undertaking of support for the 
                                                            
85. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/euro-summit/. 
86. The Euro Area Member States plus the other EU Member States except the United 
Kingdom and the Czech Republic. 
87. TSCG art. 4. 
88. TSCG art. 5. 
89. Compare TSCG art. 6 with Regulation 473/2013, supra note 79, at art. 8 (requiring 
ex ante and timely reporting to the Commission and the Eurogroup of national debt issuance 
plans according to a harmonised reporting format). 
90. TSCG art. 7:  
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EU executive unless a qualified majority is against its input. The 
Commission is given a monitoring role under the TSCG, and there is 
even a stronger role for the CJEU than under the TFEU.91 If the 
Commission, or another Member State, finds that a Member State 
fails to abide by the ‘fiscal compact’ provision,92 they may bring the 
matter before the CJEU, even requesting the judges to impose a 
financial penalty if the State concerned continues to flout the rules.  
The TSCG partners undertake to work towards an economic 
policy underpinning the proper functioning of EMU, in wording that 
may indicate an intention to adopt a single economic policy.93 
Convergence is further fostered by the undertaking to discuss and, 
where appropriate coordinate among themselves, ‘all major economic 
policy reforms that they plan to undertake.’94 The governance of the 
euro area is strengthened by institutionalising Euro Summit 
meetings95 and the promotion of joint input from the national 
parliaments and the European Parliament.96  
From a legal perspective, the relationship between the TSCG and 
the TFEU is intriguing. Within five years from the entry into force of 
the TSCG, its substance is to be incorporated into the legal framework 
of the European Union.97 At the outset, the TSCG states that it is to be 
applied and interpreted in conformity with the TEU and the TFEU. 
                                                                                                                                     
While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro 
commit to supporting the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European 
Commission where it considers that a Member State of the European Union whose 
currency is the euro is in breach of the deficit criterion in the framework of an 
excessive deficit procedure. This obligation shall not apply where it is established 
among the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro that a qualified majority 
of them, calculated by analogy with the relevant provisions of the Treaties on which 
the European Union is founded, without taking into account the position of the 
Contracting Party concerned, is opposed to the decision proposed or recommended. 
91. Compare TSCG art. 8, with TFEU art. 126(10), which excludes access to the CJEU 
for infringement of paras 1-9 thereof. 
92. TSCG arts. 3(2), referring to TSCG art. 3(1), containing material budgetary rules and 
the requirement of translating these into national (preferably constitutional) statutory 
requirements. 
93. TSCG art. 9 (“ . . . to work jointly towards an economic policy that fosters the proper 
functioning of the economic and monetary union and economic growth through enhanced 
convergence and competitiveness.”). 
94. TSCG art. 11. 
95. TSCG art. 11. 
96. TSCG art. 13. Two inter-parliamentary meetings based on this provision have been 
held in Vilnius (2013) and in Brussels and Rome (2014). See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
relnatparl/en/conferences/article-13.html. 
97. TCSG art. 16. 
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The TSCG is to apply only ‘insofar as it is compatible with the 
Treaties on which the European Union is founded and with European 
Union law. Also, ‘[i]t shall not encroach upon the competence of the 
Union to act in the area of the economic union.’98 This shows that the 
signatories were well aware of the duplication with EU primary and 
secondary law, and of the need to respect EU law when acting outside 
of the Treaty-given institutional framework. 
H. Excessive Imbalances Procedure 
Beyond the area of budgetary soundness, the shock of policy 
makers having overlooked imbalances in the economy prodded 
legislative reform, as well. Next to the establishment of the European 
Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”),99 with a special role for the ECB,100 
to strengthen macro-prudential oversight over the financial system, 
and simultaneously with the establishment of the European 
Supervisory Authorities (“ESAs”),101 a mechanism for the 
Commission to monitor, and for the Council to recommend 
redressing, macro-economic imbalances in the economy at large was 
                                                            
98. TCSG art. 2. 
99. Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and 
establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1 . 
100. Including a first application of TFEU art. 127(6), the enabling provision to make the 
ECB competent to exercise operational supervisory powers. This provision later formed the 
basis for the establishment of the SSM in the context of banking union. See Council 
Regulation No. 1096/2010 of 17/11/2010 conferring specific tasks upon the European Central 
Bank concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1 
(EU). 
101. For the founding instruments, see for the European Banking Authority (EBA): 
Regulation No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending 
Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 
12 (EU), most recently amended by Regulation No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the 
resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single 
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 
1093/2010. For a consolidated version, see the EBA’s website, available at 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/about-us/legal-framework/founding-texts-and-mandates. For the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), see Regulation No. 1095/2010, 2010 O.J. 
(L 331) 84 (EU), and for the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) see Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 48. All regulations 
are of the same date and appeared in the same edition of the Official Journal. 
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established.102 This alert mechanism identifies imbalances, defined as: 
‘any trend giving rise to macroeconomic developments which are 
adversely affecting, or have the potential adversely to affect, the 
proper functioning of the economy of a Member State or of the 
economic and monetary union, or of the Union as a whole.’ 
Imbalances are ‘excessive’ when they are ‘severe’; these include 
‘imbalances that jeopardise or risk jeopardising the proper functioning 
of the economic and monetary union.’103 A scoreboard with a limited 
set of economic, financial, and structural indicators104 with indicative 
thresholds is monitored by the Commission. It publishes an annual 
report with outcomes.105 For each EU Member State considered to be 
affected by imbalances, the Commission publishes an in-depth 
review,106 and the Council may follow-up with a public 
recommendation.107 Excessive imbalances may lead the Council to 
adopt recommendations to individual Member States which may be 
made public.108  
Once the Excessive Imbalances Procedure (“EIP”) has been 
opened, an EU Member State is to submit a corrective action plan.109 
This plan is either to be endorsed by the Council with a 
recommendation specifying specific action required to redress the 
excessive imbalance and the accompanying deadlines, or to be 
considered insufficient. In the latter case, a new plan is to be 
submitted. The corrective action plan, the Commission report thereon, 
and the Council recommendation are to be made public. Non-
compliance with the corrective action plan can lead to a Council 
decision establishing non-compliance, together with a 
recommendation setting new deadlines for taking corrective action.110 
Such Council decision is deemed adopted if the Council has not 
                                                            
102. Regulation No. 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, 2011 O.J. (L 
306) 25 (EU). 
103. Id. art. 2. 
104. Id. The scoreboard includes: the current account balance, the net international 
investment position, export market shares, nominal unit labour costs, real effective exchange 
rates, the evolution of unemployment, private sector debt, private sector credit flow, house 
prices, and the general government sector debt. 
105. Regulation 1176/2011, supra note 43, art. 3, at 25. 
106. Id. art. 5, at 25. 
107. Id. art. 6, at 25. 
108. Id. art. 7, at 25. 
109. Id. art. 7 & 8, at 25. 
110. Id. art. 10, at 25. 
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rejected the Commission’s recommendation on establishing 
noncompliance: reverse QMV.111 The State concerned does not have 
a vote in its own procedure.112 The EIP applies Union-wide. 
For euro area Member States, a separate legal act gives bite to 
the EIP with sanctions.113 An interest-bearing deposit equal to 0.1% 
of GDP114 shall be required when the Council concludes that the 
Member State has not taken recommended corrective action.115 A 
yearly fine may be imposed in case of two successive Council 
recommendations in the same EIP where the Council considers that 
the Member State has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan, 
or where two successive Council recommendations in the same EIP 
find non-compliance with the corrective action plan.116 Decisions are 
made by reverse QMV117 by the other Member States of the Euro 
Area.118 The EIP has been put into practice, with excessive 
imbalances recently found in three, and imbalances in sixteen other 
Member States.119 No serious follow-up in the form of sanctions has, 
as yet, taken place.120 A publication by the European Commission 
itself shows a meagre 40% response rate to macro-economic policy 
recommendations, both from the MIP121 and from other economic 
governance tools.122  
                                                            
111. Id. 
112. Id. art. 12, at 25. 
113. Regulation 1174/2011, supra note 45. It applies to participating Member States 
only. Id. art. 1(1), at 10. 
114. Id. art. 3(5), at 10. 
115. Id. art. 3(1), at 10. 
116. Id. art. 3(2), at 10. 
117. Id. art. 3(3), at 10. By (regular) QMV, the Council may amend the Commission’s 
recommendation to impose a sanction. 
118. Id. art. 3(7), at 10. 
119. See the Commission’s Alert Mechanism Report 2015, which describes the process 
of balance-sheet repair and the remaining imbalances in many Member States. Report From 
The Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank and the 
European Economic and Social Committee, COM (2014) 904 final (Nov. 28, 2004). 
120. For an overview of the MIP’s application, see Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/
macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/index_en.htm (last updated Mar. 3, 2015). 
121. Macro-economic Imbalances Procedure, as the EIP has been dubbed in euro 
parlance. 
122. See generally Servaas Deroose & Jörn Griesse, Implementing Economic Reforms–
Are EU Member States Responding to European Semester Recommendations?, EDFIN ECON. 
BRIEF, October 2014, at 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
economic_briefs/2014/pdf/eb37_en.pdf. 
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I. Euro Plus Pact, Strengthening of Commission 
EU politicians make a lot of their commitment to 
competitiveness. Lack of competitiveness of European economies 
was often cited as a cause for the crisis. In the spring of 2011, twenty-
three States agreed a ‘Euro Plus Pact.’123 In this ‘pact,’ the Heads of 
State and Government of the Euro Area and Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania124 agreed to undertake 
national commitments in areas that fall under their own, national 
competence,125 and to ‘monitor politically’ their implementation. 
Legally, the Pact is no more than a set of commitments adopted in the 
European Council’s conclusions. Its main purpose was to show 
determination to address fundamental economic policy issues in a 
coordinated manner. Important in view of the lack of true 
coordination of the crisis response, the adherents to the Euro Plus Pact 
‘commit to consult their partners on each major economic reform 
having potential spill-over effects before its adoption.’126 Fostering 
competitiveness and employment, furthering sustainability of public 
finances and reinforcing financial stability are the four core concerns 
that the Pact identifies. It specifically mentions the development of 
unit labour costs in line with productivity growth, the review of wage 
setting arrangements, the opening up of sheltered sectors of the 
economy and reducing bureaucracy, especially for small and medium-
sized enterprises (“SMEs”), as goals to be pursued. In labour markets, 
                                                            
123. Annex I to the Conclusions of the European Council, 24-15 March 2011, available 
at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/120296.pdf. 
124. Since, Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015) have adopted the single currency. 
125. As the document emphasises time and again. 
126. This requirement has since been given legal force in TSCG, art. 11: ‘ . . . the 
Contracting Parties ensure all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will 
be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves’, in a procedure 
that involves the EU institutions. 
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‘flexicurity’127 will be sought, a combination of flexibility and job 
security that should appeal to employers and employees alike.128  
This already lengthy overview would not be complete without 
mentioning the institutional strengthening of the European 
Commission’s member holding the economic portfolio.129 In October 
2011, the EMU portfolio holder was elevated to Commission Vice 
President, and a Chief Economic Advisor was appointed. The idea 
was that Olli Rehn would have similar self-standing responsibilities 
as the Commissioner for competition, who also relies on a Chief 
Economist to pursue antitrust cases.130 
J. Assessment 
The governance amendments reveal a specific perspective on the 
origins of the crisis. It is seen as originating in excessive debt 
accumulation, both private (housing bubbles, over-consumption 
fuelled by low interest rates) and public debt (government largesse). 
Statistical fraud was behind late discovery of the public spending 
situation in Greece, and lack of independent statistics and economic 
forecasts as the basis for budgetary planning had been a general issue 
in Europe. Both issues are addressed. Economic imbalances could 
thus develop that need monitoring, and redress. The focus in all of 
this is at individual Member States, and the approach is punitive in 
nature. National governments are to be disciplined and, if 
                                                            
127. ‘Flexicurity’ had been a feature of the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ to make the EU the most 
competitive and the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010, a much-
touted effort that proved unattainable. Innovation, education, and a knowledge-based economy 
were key words. The Lisbon Strategy was followed by ‘Europe 2020’, which the initiating 
Commission calls ‘a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.’ Communication 
from the Commission, A Strategy For Smart, Sustainable And Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 
2020 final (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-
2014/president/news/documents/pdf/20100303_1_en.pdf. The Europe 2020 Strategy has 
quantifiable goals in respect of employment, government spending on research and 
development (R&D), CO2 emissions, and poverty reduction.  
128. On ‘flexicurity’, see Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and Better 
Jobs through Flexibility and Security, Document COM (2007) 359 final, (Nov. 27, 2007), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0359. 
129. Olli Rehn appointed Commission Vice President, with Additional Instruments, 
Algirdas Šemeta responsible for Eurostat, EUR. COMMISSION (Oct. 27, 2011), http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-11-1284_en.htm. 
130. A similar move towards copying from competition law enforcement practices can 
be seen in the competence to adopt of fining guidelines similar to those applicable under 
competition law, to enforce the new rules on avoidance of statistics manipulation. Regulation 
1174/2011, supra note 45, art. 8, at 10. 
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recommendations and warnings fail, sanctions should apply in respect 
of euro area Member States. Although a more contractual form has 
been pondered, the top-down imposition of discipline prevailed. This 
was coupled with public scrutiny, and open debate: the requirement to 
publish programmes of redress and the economic dialogue provisions 
seek to foster debate and correction by the media. Here, the absence 
of a common European media space makes itself felt. Such 
discussions take place among the experts and those responsible 
(Ecofin, Euro Group, European Council, and ECB Governing 
Council) and are only reflected in the national debate, held in a 
national language, not in a shared language, such as in the United 
States.  
K. Need for Thorough Rethinking 
In the economic governance reboot, joint policy-making is not 
really explored,131 beyond shared views on the appropriateness of 
national policies. Article 122(1) TFEU, the sole Treaty provision that 
allows the Union to adopt economic policy measures, is conspicuous 
in its absence. With the emphasis on national policies that need to 
converge, and align with a certain view of correctness, perennial 
discord between Brussels and national capitals is assured. The 
envisaged new report on deepening EMU, to be presented by the Four 
Presidents132 to the European Council in June 2015, may suggest 
‘proposals on further steps towards pooled sovereignty in economic 
governance.’133 
On paper, there have been joint stimulus programmes: three to 
date. At the depth of the financial crisis, the Commission adopted a 
                                                            
131. The TSCG’s mentioning, in Article 9, of ‘ . . . an economic policy that fosters the 
proper functioning of the economic and monetary union and economic growth’ may perhaps 
be read as a precursor to a single policy. 
132. The Presidents of the Commission, the European Council, the Euro Group and the 
ECB. Earlier Presidents’ Reports on deepening EMU have been presented. See Towards a 
Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European 
Council In close collaboration with: José Manuel Barroso, President of the European 
Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Eurogroup Mario Draghi, President of the 
European Central Bank of 5 December 2012, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf. 
133. European Commission, Making the Best Use of the Flexibility within the Existing 
Rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, COM(2015) 12 Final Provisional, at 18 (January 
2015). 
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European Economic Recovery Plan,134 which urged a joint fiscal 
stimulus and efforts to restore competitiveness in national economies. 
At their meeting on June 29, 2012, the European Council adopted a 
Compact for Growth and Jobs, promising to unlock EU€120 billion 
through various windows.135 This produced a nice headline but there 
is no way of testing whether this initiative led to any change actually 
felt on the ground, in depressed areas or by disadvantaged citizens. 
Upon its inauguration, the new European Commission announced An 
Investment Plan for Europe,136 a plan ‘to mobilise at least EU€315 
billion in additional public and private investment into the real 
economy,’ acting together with the European Investment Bank 
(“EIB”). The Commission proposes the establishment of European 
Fund for Strategic Investments,137 the idea being that public 
guarantees can unlock private investments, notably favouring small 
and medium-sized enterprises. It is too soon to judge the latest 
stimulus proposal.  
One must conclude that, until now, the EU did not have at its 
disposal means of swift and effective budgetary intervention. 
Economic stabilisers function at national level. Working towards an 
EU-, or euro area-wide system of economic stabilisers is called for. 
Only then will asymmetric shocks be absorbed at the level of the 
European economy. Introducing a modest shock-absorbing 
capacity,138 e.g., through a basic funding at euro area level of 
unemployment benefits that individual States provide, may help 
diminish the need for recurring debates on funding governments of 
depressed States. 
                                                            
134. European Commission, A European Economic Recovery Plan, COM(2008) 800 
final (November 2008), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:52008DC0800&from=EN. This Commission Communication followed another 
one ‘From financial crisis to recovery: A European framework for action’, COM(2008) 706 
final), issued one month before, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0706&from=EN. 
135. See European Council, Conclusion of the Compact for Growth and Jobs 3(h), 29 
June 2012, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/131388.pdf. 
136. European Commission, An Investment Plan for Europe, COM(2014) 903 Final 
(November 2014). 
137. See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the European Fund for Strategic Investments and Amending Regulations 
(EH) No 1291/2013 and (EU) No 1316/2013, COM(2015) 10 Final (January 2015) 
(establishing the Fund in COM(2015) 10 final). 
138. Authors connected to the Bruegel think-tank have explored this. See Bruegel, 
http://www.bruegel.org. 
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L. Legal Peculiarities  
The nature of the crisis response, with its emphasis on State 
interventions, coordinated ex post and on the threat of punitive 
measures, and the involvement of the IMF, has led to legal 
peculiarities. Convergence of economic policies, and restoration of 
budgetary soundness have been strictly enforced in respect of the 
‘peripheral’ Member States through conditions attached to the 
financing provided. In accordance with IMF practice, these conditions 
were contained in Memoranda of Understanding (“MoUs”), agreed 
between the Member State concerned and the lending authorities.139 
But, they were also enshrined in legal acts at Union level: 
implementing decisions on the granting of financial assistance, and 
decisions under the EDP/SGP, and Article 136 TFEU,140 addressed to 
Greece,141 Ireland,142 Portugal,143 Spain,144 and Cyprus.145 This 
implies that the binding nature of the commitments emanates from 
Union law, with a supremacy status vis-à-vis national law.146 Thus, 
                                                            
139. See Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission acting on 
behalf of the Euro Area Member States and the Hellenic Republic, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/2012-03-01-greece-mou_en.pdf. 
140. Article 136 TFEU makes the Council competent to take action to ensure the proper 
functioning of EMU in respect of Euro area Member States. The Council can adopt measures 
relating to a strengthening of coordination and surveillance of budgetary discipline, and set out 
economic policy guidelines, respecting the EU-wide BEPGs. 
141. Council Decision of 10 May 2010 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing 
and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit 
reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2010/320/EU), O.J. L 
145/6, 11 June 2010; and Council Decision of 13 March 2012 amending Decision 
2011/734/EU addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance 
and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to 
remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2012/211/EU), L 113/8, 25 April 2012. 
142. Council Implementing Decision of 7 December 2010 on granting Union financial 
assistance to Ireland (2011/77/EU), O.J. L 30/34, 4 February 2011, as lastly amended Council 
Implementing Decision of 22 January 2013 (2013/48/EU), O.J. L 21/30, 24 January 2013. 
143. Council Implementing Decision of 30 May 2011 on granting Union financial 
assistance to Portugal (2011/344/EU), O.J. L 159/88, 17 June 2011, lastly amended by Council 
Implementing Decision of 18 February 2014 (2014/197/EU) , O.J. L 107/61, 10 April 2014. 
144. Council Decision of 23 July 2012 addressed to Spain on specific measures to 
reinforce financial stability (2012/443/EU), O.J. L 202/17, 28 July 2012. 
145. Council Decision of 25 April 2013 addressed to Cyprus on specific measures to 
restore financial stability and sustainable growth (2013/236/EU), O.J. L 141/32, 28 May 2013, 
lastly amended by Council Implementing Decision of 24 March 2014 amending Implementing 
Decision 2013/463/EU on approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme for Cyprus 
(2014/169/EU), O.J. L 91/40, 27 March 2014. 
146. See Declaration 17 to the Treaty of Lisbon, Declaration Concerning Primacy, 2007 
O.J. (C 306) (referring to settled case law of the CJEU, notably Case 6/64 (Costa/ENEL)). 
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the conditionality imposed on borrowing Member States is 
characterised by a variety of legal vessels,147 with the same content. It 
is clear that the strictness of the convergence compliance varies with 
the status of the Member State. Incisive, detailed economic policy 
prescriptions have been addressed to States in need of ‘bail-out’ by 
their peers.148 Other Member States have largely escaped this strict 
scrutiny.  
M. Flexibility of Enforcement 
The same variations in applying strict enforcement can be seen 
in the practice of the EDP/SGP enforcement. Sharply increased 
sanctioning powers have not been applied. This is partially explained 
by the emphasis on structural reform and the focus on structural rather 
than actual budget deficits.  
Where the TFEU’s budgetary norm of a budget deficit exceeding 
3% of GDP as excessive, in principle,149 refers to the nominal deficit 
as reported on the basis of actual budget figures, the SGP refers to the 
structural balance between government income and expenses. This 
                                                            
147. Including financing agreements with the EFSF, or the ESM, which can be found at 
their websites http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/operations/index.htm and http://www.esm.
europa.eu/assistance/index.htm. See The Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement 
between European Financial Stability Facility Kingdom of Spain as Beneficiary Member State 
Fondo De Reestructuracion Ordenanda Bancaria as Guarantor and The Bank of Spain, 
available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_spain_ffa.pdf; The Master Financial 
Assistance Facility Agreement between European Financial Stability Facility the Hellenic 
Republic as Beneficiary Member State the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund as Guarantor and 
the Bank of Greece (as amended by the Amendment Agreement dated 12 December 2012), 
available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_greece_fafa.pdf. A Second 
Amendment Agreement, extending the MFAF until and including February 28, 2015, was 
concluded on December 19, 2014. See Second Amendment Agreement Relating to the Master 
Financial Assistance Facility Agreement (as amended by an Amendment Agreement dated 12 
December 2012) between European Financial Stability Facility The Hellenic Republic as 
Beneficiary Member State Hellenic Financial Stability Fund as Guarantor and The Bank of 
Greece, available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/Second%20Amendment%20
Agreement%20Greek%20MFFA.pdf. As is explained by a document on the ESM’s website, 
www.esm.europa.eu, the EFSF Board of Directors, on February 27, 2015, decided to further 
extend the Greek MFFA by four months until June 30, 2015. The MoU did not have to be 
amended as it does not have an expiry date. 
148. Illustrative of the breadth and depth of the required reforms is reading the 
provisions of the Implementing Decisions in respect of Greece (Article 2 of Decision 
2010/320/EU), Portugal (Article 3 of Decision 2011/344/EU), Ireland (Article 3 of Decision 
2011/77/EU), and Cyprus (Article 2 of Decision 2013/236/EU). 
149. Note that TFEU art. 126(2) contains qualitative language requiring discretionary 
assessment of the existence of an excessive deficit on the basis of a quantitative reference 
value of 3%. 
1162 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1135 
structural deficit is the product of corrections for incidental factors 
and cyclical movements. The structural deficit is calculated on the 
basis of the nation’s ‘output gap,’ i.e., the deviation of actual and 
potential GDP.150 This ‘top-down approach’ to the structural deficit is 
complemented by a ‘bottom-up approach’ under which the effects of 
budgetary measures (tax increases and savings) is measured,151 net of 
their subsequent budgetary effects through their impact on GDP.152  
The second reason why flexibility of enforcement seems to be 
the norm is the emphasis on structural reform as a possible element to 
grant longer periods of budgetary adjustment to Member States that 
are verifiably serious about such reform. Recently, the European 
Commission, prodded by Italy and France, codified this, and other 
exceptions to the rules in an ‘interpretative communication,’153 which 
‘provides additional guidance, without changing or replacing the 
existing rules.’ This document sets out Commission policy in respect 
of budgetary contributions to its Investment Plan for Europe,154 and 
elaborates earlier practice. Notably, under strict conditions, public 
investment may justify a deviation from the MTBO (‘investment 
clause’). Under the ‘structural reform,’ the Commission may grant 
eligible Member States additional time to reach the MTBO.  
N. France’s Prolonged Effort to Bring Nominal Deficit Under 3% of 
GDP 
Immediately applying this new interpretation, the Commission 
has recommended, on February 27, 2015, to the Ecofin Council to 
allow France yet another two-year extension of the deadline for 
                                                            
150. See Johannes Hers & Wim Suyker, Structural Budget Balance: A Love at First 
Sight Turned Sour (CPB Economic Policy Analysis, 2014/07), available at http://www.cpb.nl/
en/publication/structural-budget-balance-love-first-sight-turned-sour. CBP stands for CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), an independent policy research and 
advice body for the Dutch government.  
151. See Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European 
Commission, European Economic Forecast 33 (EU, Spring 2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee2_en.pdf. 
152. Budget measures will have an effect on GDP, which in turn, translates in effects for 
the budget, e.g. savings measures may lead to lower tax income, thus increasing the deficit.  
153. European Commission, Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the Existing 
Rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, COM(2015) 12 Final Provisional, (January 2015), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/2015-01-13_
communication_sgp_flexibility_guidelines_en.pdf. 
154. National contributions to the EFSI will not be taken into account when assessing 
compliance with the Union’s budgetary norms. 
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finally bringing its budget (just) within the 3% norm. After a Council 
recommendation to France in 2009 had given it time to redress its 
budget deficit by 2012, a one-year extension was granted in 2013, and 
a further two-year extension in 2013, because ‘although effective 
action had been taken by the French authorities, unexpected adverse 
economic events with major unfavourable consequences for 
government finances had occurred after the adoption of the [earlier] 
Council recommendation.’ French commitments under its Economic 
Partnership programme155 and new engagements subsequently 
submitted, plus an assessment of the budgetary measures taken,156 led 
the Commission to conclude that ‘the available evidence does not 
allow to conclude on no effective action’ and that a further extension 
to 2017 is warranted.157 If this recommendation is adopted, France 
will have struggled for eight years to get its nominal deficit (just)158 
under 3%, albeit under strict scrutiny to adopt structural reforms. 
O. Joint Debt Issuance: Mere Study 
This assessment of the economic governance developments 
would not be complete without mentioning the investigations into 
joint debt issuance by the Member States. Jointly tapping the markets 
may prevent these from excluding governments from a reliable source 
of finance, but should, of course, heed the requirements of sound 
budgetary policies which the Treaty contain. The CJEU has 
interpreted the ‘no bail-out’ clause as permitting the establishment of 
a permanent mechanism to meet financing requirements of euro area 
Member States that experience, or are threatened by, severe financing 
problems, if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the 
                                                            
155. Prescribed under Article 9 of Regulation 473/2013, one of the two legal acts from 
the ‘two-pack.’ 
156. Comparing the ‘fiscal effort’ undertaken with the level previously recommended by 
the Council. 
157. Recommendation for a Council Recommendation with a View to Bringing an End 
to the Excessive Government Deficit in France, COM(2015) 115 Final, (February 2015), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/126-
07_commission/2015-02-27_fr_126-7_commission_en.pdf. European Commission, all legal 
acts in relation to the EDP of France, available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/france_en.htm. 
158. The Commission recommends France to reach a 2.8% nominal budget deficit in 
2017. After submission of the manuscript, the Ecofin Council adopted the recommendation to 
France; see: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%206704%202015%20
INIT. 
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euro area as a whole and of its Member States.159 But providing 
finance to fellow Member States can only be accepted under Article 
125 TFEU when it is assured that ‘the Member States remain subject 
to the logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that ought 
to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline. Compliance with 
such discipline contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher 
objective, namely maintaining the financial stability of the monetary 
union.’160 Even under the Court’s broad, objectives-based 
interpretation of the ‘no bail-out’ clause, Article 125 TFEU stands in 
the way of joint issuance.   
An expert group established by the European Commission has 
scrutinised innovative mechanisms to reduce the current mountain of 
public debt,161 or to experiment with joint issue of ‘euro bills’—short-
term sovereign debt instruments.162 Its report163 highlights the legal 
difficulties of proceeding in this area. This Author, taking a longer-
term perspective, considers that the introduction of Eurobonds may 
create a safe asset for a deeply liquid financial market whilst ensuring 
effective leverage over Member States’ budgetary policies. Sound and 
sustainable budgets can be fostered through conditions attached to 
access to the joint funding and by topping up the interest rate 
individual governments need to pay to the joint debt-issuing agency. 
All of this requires Treaty amendment. Member States might first 
explore joint issuance by setting up a joint agency by separate treaty 
that, like the TSCG, will later be woven into the TFEU. 
II. UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY MEASURES  
The response by policy-makers and legislators was swift and 
encompassing. So was the response of the central banks. They were 
                                                            
159. Judgment of 27 November 2012 in Case C-370/12 (Pringle). 
160. Id. at para. 135. 
161. Hasan Doluca et al., The European Redemption Pact: An Illustrative Guide, 
(German Council of Econ. Experts Working Paper 02/2012, 2012), available at 
http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/download/publikationen/
working_paper_02_2012.pdf. 
162. The ELEC “Euro T-Bill Fund” A proposal for a two-year refinancing for all € 
bills/optional refinancing of bond maturities until 2015, EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC 
CO-OPERATION (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.eleclece.eu/en/system/files/publications/elec-
viewpoints/monetary/mon-12jan-emubondfund.pdf. Disclosure: the present author contributed 
to this proposal and wrote Appendix II on the legal constraints. 
163. Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills, chaired by Gertrude 
Tumpel-Gugerell, Final Report (March 31, 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/articles/governance/pdf/20140331_report_en.pdf. 
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the first to act when markets froze, and liquidity dried up in the 
summer of 2007 and, seriously, in 2008. Successive waves of long-
term liquidity were provided to the markets, swap arrangements were 
agreed among major central banks, so that euro area banks could also 
borrow dollars at the ECB, and interest rates were lowered to 
unprecedented levels in order to stimulate demand. The ECB was not 
alone here but acted in concert with fellow monetary authorities.  
A. Addressing Convertibility Risk 
Other central banks, serving a single jurisdiction, could 
sometimes act more decisively, and were not hindered by the mistrust 
in the single currency, and the reappearance of convertibility risk in 
Europe. The ECB faced a crisis of faith, of the financial markets and 
of citizens and companies, in the irreversible nature of the transition 
to monetary union. The ECB had to deal with financial fragmentation 
on the euro area, re-balkanisation of financial markets in Europe, and 
the fear164 of euro collapse or, not as far as that, ‘Grexit’, or other 
national economies leaving the currency union and re-introducing 
separate currencies. The extremely high level of interest rates in 
‘peripheral’ States thwarted the transmission of the ECB’s monetary 
policy: the lowering of interest rates in Frankfurt didn’t any more 
translate in interest rate reductions in ‘peripheral’ States.165 Investors 
were not only weary of buying or holding public debt, they also 
openly speculated on States leaving the currency union, and on the 
demise of the euro. Strong commitment to the euro’s irreversibility166 
and the announcement of measures that would help re-integrate the 
euro money markets and restore the transmission mechanism for the 
single monetary policy167 calmed markets and reinstated trust.  
                                                            
164. For some: the hope. Dislike of the single currency has united people across the 
continent in political movements that sometimes also dislike European integration, 
globalisation and everything ‘foreign.’ 
165. Explained on the ECB’s website. Mechanism of monetary policy, EUROPEAN 
CENTRAL BANK, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/transmission/html/index.en.html. 
166. Mario Draghi, President, European Central Bank, Speech at the Global Investment 
Conference in London (July 26, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/
2012/html/sp120726.en.html. 
167. Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A), Mario Draghi, 
President, European Central Bank, Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President, European Central Bank, 
Introductory statement to the press at Frankfurt am Main (Sept. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html. 
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Nevertheless, the Press Release of September 6, 2012 specifying 
the technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions (“OMT”)168 
came under attack in Germany, which led to the referral by the 
German Constitutional Court of preliminary questions about the scope 
of the ECB’s powers in Case C-62/14 (Gauweiler).169 Whatever the 
merits of the court case, and without a translation of the press release 
into legal acts170 or actual market operations, the mere announcements 
of OMT in the summer of 2012 had real effects. It led to sharp 
reductions of interest rates. Remaining differences could be ascribed 
to the different standing of governments in terms of creditworthiness. 
B. Widening Collateral Requirements 
These differences in creditworthiness also played a role in the 
necessity for the Eurosystem to widen the scope of collateral that is 
eligible in its borrowing operations. The ECB and the NCBs can only 
lend on the basis of ‘adequate collateral.’171 Sovereign bonds with an 
adequate credit rating were accepted as collateral. When CRAs 
adapted these ratings to changed market conditions, and perceptions, 
their downgrades narrowed the scope for borrowing by banks from 
‘peripheral’ Member States, at the very moment that they were most 
in need of cash. The ECB has taken successive steps to widen eligible 
collateral to ensure continued use of Greek,172 Irish,173 and 
Portuguese174 government bonds in the monetary policy operations of 
the Eurosystem. Recently, the ECB withdrew this status from Greek 
                                                            
168. Press Release, European Central Bank, Technical features of Outright Monetary 
Transactions, (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/
pr120906_1.en.html. 
169. Opinion of the Advocate General of 14 January 2015; judgment pending. 
170. During the oral hearing before the CJEU, on 14 October 2014, it became clear that 
the ECB had drafted legal acts to operationalise OMT. The draft legal acts had been submitted 
to the Court but not yet made public. 
171. Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank, art. 18.1. 
172. Decision of the European Central Bank of 6 May 2010 on temporary measures 
relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek 
Government (ECB/2010/3), 2010 O.J. (L 117) 102. Note that subsequent decisions in respect 
of Greek collateral have been taken. 
173. Decision of the European Central Bank of 31 March 2011 on temporary measures 
relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Irish 
Government (ECB/2011/4), 2011 O.J. (L 94) 33. 
174. Decision of the European Central Bank of 7 July 2011 on temporary measures 
relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the 
Portuguese Government (ECB/2011/10), 2011 O.J. (L 182) 31. 
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government bonds175 as the new Greek government was no longer 
securely in a programme with its creditors, one of the conditions for 
accepting, with sharply increased haircuts,176 such collateral. The 
widening of collateral requirements likewise sparked protest; it came 
under fire from German claimants before the CJEU.177 
C. Buying Sovereign Bonds 
Two years before announcing OMT, simultaneously with the 
establishment of the Greek loan facility, on Europe Day (May 9th) 
2010, the ECB introduced a Securities Market Programme 
(“SMP”).178 Under the SMP, the ECB bought both sovereign bonds of 
Member States whose interest rates had become markedly out-of-line 
with the euro area average, and debt instruments issued by private 
entities. A quote from the preamble of the legal act clarifies the 
ECB’s thinking when adopting the SMP:  
[ ] the Governing Council decided and publicly announced that, 
in view of the current exceptional circumstances in financial 
markets, characterised by severe tensions in certain market 
segments which are hampering the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism and thereby the effective conduct of monetary policy 
oriented towards price stability in the medium term, a temporary 
securities markets programme (the “programme”) should be 
initiated. Under the programme, the euro area NCBs, according 
to their percentage shares in the key for subscription of the 
ECB’s capital, and the ECB, in direct contact with counterparties, 
may conduct outright interventions in the euro area public and 
private debt securities markets. The programme forms part of the 
Eurosystem’s single monetary policy and will apply temporarily. 
The programme’s objective is to address the malfunctioning of 
securities markets and restore an appropriate monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. 
                                                            
175.  Decision (EU) 2015/300 of the ECB of 10 February 2015 on the eligibility of 
marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic 
(ECB/2015/6), 2015 O.J. (L 53) 29. 
176. Meaning that sovereign bonds with an impaired credit status do not count for 100% 
of their face value; they are accepted as collateral at a steep discount only. 
177. Order of the General Court of 16 December 2011 in Case T-532/11 (Städter v. 
ECB), appeal rejected by Order of the Court of 15 November 2012 in Case C-102/12P. 
178. Decision of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2010 establishing a securities 
markets programme (ECB/2010/5) (2010/281/EU), 2010 O.J. (L 124) 8. 
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The link of the SMP with economic policy undertakings by the 
affected Member States becomes clear in the following quote from 
the preamble of the legal act establishing the programme: 
The Governing Council has taken note of the statement of the 
euro area Member State governments that they ‘will take all 
measures needed to meet their fiscal targets this year and the 
years ahead in line with excessive deficit procedures’ and the 
precise additional commitments taken by some euro area 
Member State governments to accelerate fiscal consolidation and 
ensure the sustainability of their public finances. 
The SMP was ended with the announcement of the OMT, in 
September 2012. The link between purchases by the central bank of 
sovereign bonds and the direction of national economic policy was 
maintained as is evident from the section on ‘conditionality’ in the 
press release on OMT. It states: ‘[a] necessary condition for Outright 
Monetary Transactions is strict and effective conditionality attached 
to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European 
Stability Mechanism (“EFSF/ESM”) programme.’  
D. Other Bond Purchases  
At the same time of the introduction of the SMP, another 
programme was announced: the Covered Bonds Purchasing 
Programme (“CBPP”). According to the preamble of the relevant 
legal act,179 the CBPP had four objectives: ‘(a) promoting the ongoing 
decline in money market term rates; (b) easing funding conditions for 
credit institutions and enterprises; (c) encouraging credit institutions 
to maintain and expand their lending to clients; and (d) improving 
market liquidity in important segments of the private debt securities 
market.’ 
The first CBPP was followed by a second such programme in 
2011.180 Its aims were those mentioned under (b) and (c) in the 
preamble of the first CBPP decision.181 On September 4, 2014, a third 
                                                            
179. Decision of the European Central Bank of 2 July 2009 on the implementation of the 
covered bond purchase programme (ECB/2009/16) (2009/522/EC), 2009 O.J. (L 175) 18. 
180. Decision of the European Central Bank of 3 November 2011 on the implementation 
of the second covered bond purchase programme (ECB/2011/17) (2011/744/EU), 2011 O.J. (L 
297) 70. 
181. Recital 3 of the preamble to Decision ECB/2011/17 cites these objectives, 
numbering them as (a) and (b). 
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such programme was announced: CBPP3. As to its objectives, the 
recital of the relevant legal act182 states: 
CBPP3 will further enhance the transmission of monetary policy, 
facilitate credit provision to the euro area economy, generate 
positive spill-overs to other markets and, as a result, ease the 
ECB's monetary policy stance, and contribute to a return of 
inflation rates to levels closer to 2%. 
CBPP3183 was announced simultaneously with further measures, 
including an Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme 
(“ABSPP”).184 
E. Introducing Negative Interest Rates 
At the same time, the ECB effected yet another lowering of 
interest rates, including a negative rate on the deposit facility. This 
should encourage banks to cease holding funds overnight at the ECB 
and start lending to the real economy.  
F. Providing Funding on Condition of On-lending to the Real 
Economy 
On June 5, 2014, in a further effort ‘to enhance the functioning 
of the monetary policy transmission mechanism by supporting 
lending to the real economy,’ the ECB announced a new version of its 
long-term refinancing operations (“LTROs”), an instrument of 
support for the markets introduced during the crisis thanks to which 
banks can rely on funding for a prolonged period of time.185 Targeted 
LTROs (“T-LTROs”)186 provide187 inexpensive funding to banks on 
                                                            
182. Decision of the European Central Bank of 15 October 2014 on the implementation 
of the third covered bond purchase programme (ECB/2014/40) (2014/828/EU), 2014 O.J. (L 
335) 22. 
183. The amounts purchased under the SMP and the CBPPs are shown on the ECB’s 
website. Liquidity analysis, European Central Bank, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/liq/
html/index.en.html#portfolios. 
184. Decision (EU) 2015/5 of the European Central Bank of 19 November 2014 on the 
implementation of the asset-backed securities purchase programme (ECB/2014/45), 2015 O.J. 
(L 1) 4. The objectives of the ABSPP are the same as that of CBBP3, quoted in the text. 
185. For an overview of the ECB’s unconventional measures, see The ECB’s response to 
the financial crisis, ECB MONTHLY BULLETIN, (October 2010), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
pub/pdf/other/art1_mb201010en_pp59-74en.pdf??32eecc712239d864659194a97209589b. 
186. Decision of the European Central Bank of 29 July 2014 on measures relating to 
targeted longer-term refinancing operations (ECB/2014/34) (2014/541/EU), 2014 O.J. (L 258) 
11; the quote in the previous sentence on the objectives of T-LTROs is from the preamble of 
this legal act. 
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the condition that they on-lend to the private sector.188 Banks need to 
report to the ECB on such lending. Failure to meet the lending 
benchmarks obliges the banks to early repayment of funds originally 
borrowed for four years by September 2016.189  
G. Forward Guidance and Transparency 
Also unconventional, have been the ECB’s ‘forward guidance,’ 
and its decision-making transparency. The former refers to the 
practice of central banks to announce their intention to maintain the 
current monetary policy stance for a prolonged period of time. The 
latter indicates the shift towards publication of an account (not the 
minutes) of the Governing Council.190 This openness is to be 
welcomed even though it comes close to transgressing the Treaty-
based injunction not to publish the proceedings.191 This obligation to 
maintain secrecy was introduced to protect the members of the 
Governing Council, who are to act collectively in the European 
interest, from criticism based on their nationality or their 
representation of a national central bank. 
H. Quantitative Easing 
Most recently, the ECB has decided to engage in quantitative 
easing (“QE”), whereby the central banks purchases long-term bonds 
                                                                                                                                     
187. T-LTRO funding starts in 2015. See Calendar of the Targeted Long-Term 
Refinancing Operations (TILRO) in 2015, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (Dec. 16, 2014), 
available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/pdf/TLTRO-calendar-2015.en
.pdf. 
188. But not for real estate purchases by private citizens. As the preamble of the relevant 
legal act makes clear: ‘the Governing Council aims to support bank lending to the non-
financial private sector, meaning households and non-financial corporations, in Member States 
whose currency is the euro. This measure does not propose to deal with lending to households 
for the purposes of house purchases. Eligible lending to the non-financial private sector in the 
context of this measure thus excludes loans to households for the purpose of house purchases.’ 
189. See Press Release, European Central Bank, ECB announces further details of the 
targeted longer-term refinancing operations (July 3, 2014), available at http://www.ecb. 
europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140703_2.en.html. 
190. Announced by President Mario Draghi on several occasions in 2013 and 2014 and 
effected as of the first monetary policy meeting in 2015. See Account of the monetary policy 
meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on 
Wednesday and Thursday, (January 21–22, 2015), available at http://www.ecb. europa.eu/
press/accounts/2015/html/mg150219.en.pdf. 
191. ‘The proceedings of the meetings shall be confidential. The Governing Council may 
decide to make the outcome of its deliberations public.’ Protocol on the Statute of the 
European System of the Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, art. 10.4. 
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in an effort to lower long-term interest rates (thus stimulating the 
economy) and to reduce investment opportunities for banks (thus 
seeking to nudge them towards resuming credit to the real economy, 
as their returns on these long-term assets falls and lending becomes 
more attractive). The expanded asset purchase programme will 
include the CBPP3 and ASBPP.192 The contested nature of the 
programme, which was opposed by several Governing Council 
members193 can be seen in the decision on the sharing of hypothetical 
losses on purchases. Only 20% of additional assets purchases will be 
subject to loss-sharing. However, the entire Governing Council 
agreed that QE forms a monetary policy instrument that the ECB can 
legally employ.194 
I. Controversy and Contestation  
Engaging in unconventional monetary policy measures has 
involved a lot of controversy. Internally and externally, the measures 
came under fire. The ECB’s decision to engage in sovereign bond 
purchases was behind195 the resignation of German Executive Board 
member Jürgen Stark in September 2011. It is no secret that the 
announcement of OMT was opposed by Governing Council member 
Jens Weidman, President of the Bundesbank. In proceedings before 
the German Constitutional Court on the validity of these measures, 
                                                            
192. See Press Release, ECB, ECB announces expanded asset purchase programme 
(Jan. 22, 2015), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/
pr150122_1.en.html. See also, the introductory statement of ECB President Draghi of the same 
day, available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html. 
193. See supra note 190. The first-ever account of a meeting of the ECB’s Governing 
Council contains the following: ‘A number of considerations in favour of maintaining a wait-
and-see stance at the current meeting were also advanced by some members, as the cost-
benefit assessment of the proposed measures was not positive in their view.’ Id. And ‘in the 
view of some members there appeared to be no urgent need for monetary policy action at the 
current meeting.’ Id. The decision to activate QE was made by ‘a large number of members;’ 
they ‘were in favour of expanding the existing private sector asset purchase programmes to 
include purchases of a broad portfolio of securities of euro area governments and agencies and 
of supranational institutions.’ Id. The ECB President concluded that 'a large majority of voting 
members supported a decision to launch an expanded asset purchase programme.’ Id. 
194.  ‘As a general starting point, all members considered asset purchases, including 
sovereign bond purchases, to be part of the set of monetary policy instruments which, as 
foreseen in the ECB’s legal framework, were at the Governing Council’s disposal if and when 
required for it to deliver on its price stability mandate, although some members argued that this 
instrument should only be used in contingency situations.’ See id. 
195. See his interview with the German weekly Wirtschaftswoche, available at 
http://www.wiwo.de/politik/europa/juergen-stark-ezb-chefvolkswirt-nennt-politische-gruende-
fuer-ruecktritt/5967056.html. 
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the Bundesbank pleaded against the ECB, submitting a brief that sets 
out its criticism of the measure.196 Bundesbank President Weidman 
gave an expert opinion before the Karlsruhe-based German court, 
against the ECB’s representative. Hardly a sign of consensual 
decision-making at the central bank. One may even ask whether 
openly challenging an ECB decision, once adopted, is compatible 
with the independence of the central bank,197 a feature so cherished by 
the very German opponents of the ECB in respect of unconventional 
measures. 
III. BANKING UNION: OUTLINE  
The same qualified transparency that was introduced in respect 
of monetary policy operations also characterises the functioning of 
another novel arrangement in which the ECB plays a central role: 
banking union. The transparency arrangements will be touched upon 
after the following brief outline of the concept of banking union, and 
its realisation. 
A. Rationale 
When the weakness of the banking system had affected the 
standing of sovereigns who had to rescue banks and guarantee their 
liabilities, it became necessary to break the sovereign/bank doom 
loop. The Euro Area Summit of June 29, 2012 declared: ‘We affirm 
that it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and 
sovereigns.’198 By establishing a ‘banking union,’ the competence to 
effect micro-prudential supervision would be attributed to the EU 
level, so that the national bias and lack of coordination witnessed 
during the financial crisis would belong to the past. With banking 
                                                            
196. See http://www.handelsblatt.com/downloads/8124832/1/stellungnahme-bundesbank
_handelsblatt-online.pdf. 
197. As was argued by former ECB Executive Board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi in 
the Financial Times of 14 June 2013, available at http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/06/14/the-
ecb-is-doing-the-right-thing/#axzz2Wau7MEPr:  
. . . it can be questioned whether the publication of a national central bank opinion 
on monetary policy is fully in line with the Treaty requirement that no national nor 
community institution may seek to influence the members of the decision making 
bodies of the ECB. The governors of the Eurozone central banks are members of the 
ECB’s Governing Council on a personal capacity and should not represent their own 
countries’ views. 
198. Euro Area Summit Statement, Brussels, (June 29, 2012), available at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf. 
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supervision exercised at the euro area level, recapitalising banks from 
the ESM could be undertaken, thus relieving State budgets from this 
burden. In the words of the leaders of the euro area:  
When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, 
involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could, 
following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize 
banks directly. This would rely on appropriate conditionality, 
including compliance with state aid rules, which should be 
institution-specific, sector-specific or economy-wide and would 
be formalised in a Memorandum of Understanding. 
Even though, within three months, the Ministers of Finance of 
Germany, the Netherlands and Finland backtracked on this 
commitment,199 stating that direct ESM recapitalisation could only 
occur in respect of problems arising once banks had come under 
European supervision,200 a quick legislative process followed 
resulting in the adoption of legal acts that, more or less,201 establish 
banking union.  
B. Three Elements: Supervision, Resolution, Deposit Insurance 
Banking union was to consist of three elements:  
1) joint supervision by the ECB and National Competent 
Authorities (“NCAs”), together forming the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (“SSM”), of all banks in the euro area, with a strong 
central role for the ECB; 
2) a Single Resolution Mechanism (“SRM”) for banks, organised 
by the Single Resolution Board (“SRB”)202 
3) single deposit insurance.203 
                                                            
199. Joint Statement of the Ministers of Finance of Germany, the Netherlands and 
Finland, 25 September 2012, press release 175/2012 of the Finnish Ministry of Finance, 
available at http://www.ministryoffinance.fi/vm/en/03_press_releases_and_speeches/
01_press_releases/20120925JointS/name.jsp. 
200. The statement said: ‘the ESM can take direct responsibility of problems that occur 
under the new supervision, but legacy assets should be under the responsibility of national 
authorities’ (emphasis added). 
201. The qualifying language relates to the absence of unified deposit insurance. 
202. Council Regulation 806/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 225) 1 (EU). The SRM and the SRF 
will not be discussed in this contribution. 
203. As said, this element has not come to full fruition. See Directive 2014/49/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes, 2014 
O.J. (L 173) 149. 
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Banking union is based on a single rule book: a set of rules on 
prudential supervision that apply across the EU. The Single Rulebook 
has been established by the adoption of the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (“CRR”)204 and the Capital Requirements Directive 
(“CRD IV”),205 the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(“BRRD”)206 and additional legal acts.207 These EU legal acts 
partially reflect global consensus on banking standards agreed at the 
level of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”)208 
and the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”).209  
C. Single Supervisory Mechanism 
The SSM became operational on 5 November 2014 on the basis 
of a second legal act activating the enabling provision of Article 
127(6) TFEU.210 Before, the ECB had engaged in a major operation to 
assess the books of the banks it would directly supervise. The results 
of this Comprehensive Assessment and Asset Quality Review, plus 
stress test, effected in cooperation with the EBA, were made public 
                                                            
204. Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, 2013 O.J. (L 321/6). Note that the CRR has been 
amended subsequently. 
205. Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338. 
206. Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 
2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 190. 
207. Further elements of the EU’s single rulebook can be found at the EBA’s website. 
See Interactive Single Rulebook, European Banking Authority, available at http://www.eba.
europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/single-rulebook/interactive-single-rulebook/-/interactive-
single-rulebook/main_documents. 
208. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/. 
209. See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org. 
210. Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific 
tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision 
of credit institutions, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 63 [hereinafter SSM Regulation]. 
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ahead of the ECB’s assumption of operational powers of prudential 
supervision.211 
The SSM Regulation concerns micro-prudential supervision, i.e., 
supervision with a view to the soundness of individual banks. In 
2011, the ECB had been given a major role in macro-prudential 
supervision, which relates to overall systemic stability, when the 
ESRB was established.212 As of end-2014, the ECB directly 
supervises 123 significant banks213 in the euro area,214 and is directly 
responsible for licensing all banks in the euro area and for the 
authorisation of shareholders in banks.215 The non-significant banks 
are primarily supervised by their national authorities. The ECB may 
decide to directly supervise NCA-supervised banks.216 The ECB is 
responsible to ensure the effective and consistent functioning of the 
SSM217 and exercises oversight over the functioning of the SSM.218 
To this end, the ECB is given extensive regulatory powers.219 
D. Supervisory Board: New Body of the ECB 
As said, the attribution of operational supervisory powers to the 
ECB is based on Article 127(6) TFEU, an enabling provision that 
permits the Ecofin Council to awaken erstwhile dormant supervisory 
powers. Since the original Treaty arrangements did not provide for a 
decision-making mechanism in respect of banking supervision, a new 
body was introduced: the Supervisory Board. It consists of a Chair 
and Vice-Chair, four ECB representatives, and a representative for 
                                                            
211. See Aggregate Report on the Comprehensive Assessment, EUROPEAN CENTRAL 
BANK (October 2014), available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/
aggregatereportonthecomprehensiveassessment201410.en.pdf. 
212. See supra note 99.  
213. SSM Regulation, art. 6(5), 2013 O.J. (L 287) 76 (EU) SSM Regulation. For the 
supervisory powers of NCAs over other banks, see SSM Regulation, art. 6(6), 2013 O.J. (L 
287) 76 (EU). 
214. The criteria for significance of banks are set out in Art. 6(4). SSM Regulation, art. 
6(4), 2013 O.J. (L 287) 75-76 (EU) 
215. SSM Regulation, art. 4(1)(a)&(c), 14, 15, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 74, 80–81 (EU). 
216. SSM Regulation , art. 6(5)(b), 2013 O.J. (L 287) 76 (EU). 
217. SSM Regulation , art. 6(1), 2013 O.J. (L 287) 76 (EU). 
218. SSM Regulation, art. 6(5)(c), 2013 O.J. (L 287) 76 (EU).  
219. See, notably, Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the ECB of 16 April 2014 
establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between 
the ECB and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities, (SSM 
Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17), 2014 O.J. (L 141) 1. More legal acts can be found at 
the ECB’s dedicated website on the SSM: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu. 
1176 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1135 
each NCA.220 The Supervisory Board submits draft supervisory 
decisions to the Governing Council which, through a non-objection 
procedure, formally adopts them. Review by an independent panel of 
experts221 may be requested by interested parties; they may also 
directly proceed against the ECB before the CJEU. 
E. Other Legal Novelties: Treaty Basis, Separate International 
Agreement, Review, Accountability 
Many legal novelties can be discerned in banking union.222 Only 
a selected few can be noted here.223 The second leg of banking union 
has been established on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, the provision 
on harmonisation of national rules in the context of the internal 
market.224 The exercise of discretionary powers by bodies established 
under this provision was recently affirmed in respect of ESMA by the 
CJEU.225 However, Member States were reluctant to extend the 
regulation on bank resolution to the contributions to the single 
resolution fund, reserving this element to a separate treaty.226 So, in 
this area of EMU, as well, Member States took recourse to enacting 
measures outside of the main Union framework. 
With the ECB competent to direct NCAs to adopt decisions, and 
with the EU sanctioning framework for supervision227 not providing 
                                                            
220.  SSM Regulation, art. 26, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 85–86 (EU). 
221. Decision of the European Central Bank of 14 April 2014 concerning the 
establishment of an Administrative Board of Review and its Operating Rules, 2014 O.J. (L 
175) 51. Disclosure: the present author is an alternate member of the Administrative Board of 
Review (ABoR). 
222. For an insightful overview of banking union, see: Christos Gortsos, The crisis-
based EU financial regulatory intervention: Are we on the top of the prudential wave?, ERA 
FORUM (J. OF THE ACADEMY OF EUR. L.), Volume 16 (2015), issue 1. 
223. For excellent discussions of these issues, see Niamh Moloney, European Banking 
Union: Assessing the Risks and Resilience, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1609–70 (2014). 
224. Note the unanimity requirement of Article 127(6), whereas TFEU art. 114 requires 
QMV. Also, since the Lisbon Treaty, the role of the European Parliament is different under 
these provisions. By tying the adoption of Article 114-based measures to the adoption of the 
Article 127(6) legal act, the European Parliament gained more influence in the legislative 
process. 
225. Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council (Jan. 22, 2014). 
226. Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of Contributions to the Single 
Resolution Fund, 8475/15, 2014 O.J., available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?
l=EN&f=ST%208457%202014%20INIT. 
227. See, e.g., SSM Regulation, art. 18, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 82–83 (EU); Council 
Regulation (EU) 2015/159 of 27 January 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 
concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions, 2015 O.J. (L 27) 1 
(EU). 
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for sanctions in respect of individuals, the question arises which 
courts to have recourse to: the CJEU228 or national courts? The power 
of the ECB to apply national law229 makes the picture even more 
complex.230 The question of supervisory liability is raised by the 
reference, in recital 61 of the preamble to the SSM Regulation, to 
Article 340 TFEU.231 Legal review of decisions has been diversely 
arranged for the SSM and the SRM, with review of resolution 
decisions organised232 unlike those of the ECB233 but in line with 
review of decisions of the European Supervisory Authorities (“EBA,” 
“ESMA,” and “EIOPA”).234 These ESAs were established in 2011 as 
an initial institutional crisis response following the recommendations 
of the DeLarosière Report. Banking union followed just a few years 
later. 
Most interesting will be the development of supervisory practice, 
and law, at the intersection of competences attributed to the SSM and 
those remaining with national authorities, in particular conduct-of-
business rules, and the prevention of the use of the financial system 
for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing and 
consumer protection. The integrity of persons and banks is a concern 
for the ECB, as the central authority in the SSM: it needs to make an 
assessment to authorise banks, management, and shareholders. The 
                                                            
228. Directly, or after review by ABoR. 
229.  SSM Regulation, art. (4)(3), 2013 O.J. (L 287) 74–75 (EU). 
230. See generally Raffaele D’Ambrosio, Due Process and Safeguards of the Persons 
Subject to SSM Supervisory and Sanctioning Proceedings, Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica 
della Consulenza Legale, 74 BANCA D’ITALIA 1 (2013); Gijsbert ter Kuile et al., Tailor-Made 
Accountability within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, 52 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 155 
(2015). 
231. This provision provides for liability of Union institutions on the general principles 
common to the laws of the Member States. As Raffaele D’Ambrosio argues, the limitation of 
supervisory liability under the laws of many Member States, and other reasons, argue for a 
restrictive approach of liability for the ECB. See generally Raffaele D’Ambrosio, The ECB 
and NCA liability within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica 
della Consulenza Legale, 78 BANCA D’ITALIA 1 (2015). 
232. Articles 85 and 86 Regulation 806/2014 establishing an Appeal Panel. Council 
Regulation 806/2014, art. 85 & 86, 2014 O.J. (L 225) 83–84 (EU). 
233. Article 24 SSM Regulation and the ECB regulation establishing ABoR. SSM 
Regulation, art. 24, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 84-85 (EU). 
234. Articles 58–61 of Regulation 1093/2010 establishing EBA, as amended, and 
Articles 58–61 of Regulations 1094/2010 and 1095/2010 establishing EIOPA and ESMA, 
respectively. Council Regulation 1094/2010, arts. 58–61, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 77–78 (EU). 
Decisions of the Joint Board of Appeal of the ESAs can be found here: 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/about-us/organisation/joint-board-of-appeal/decisions. 
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evolution of the interplay between national and European supervision 
may determine the effectiveness of the latter. 
The novelty of far-reaching accountability and transparency 
mechanisms may be the most promising. Acknowledging that central 
bank independence235 for its monetary tasks236 differs from the 
independence237 and accountability befitting a prudential supervisor, 
special provisions were adopted. Extensive reporting and 
accountability mechanisms in the SSM Regulation, including vis-à-
vis national parliaments, have been elaborated in an Interinstitutional 
Agreement between the ECB and the European Parliament238 and in 
an MoU between the ECB and the Ecofin Council.239 These 
documents contain guarantees for the confidentiality of supervisory 
information, yet give both branches of the legislative branch wide 
powers of oversight. 
IV. OTHER MEASURES ADDRESSING THE CRISIS 
The crisis response measures that were most notable, for their 
surprising introduction against expectations of strict observance of the 
‘no bail-out’ spirit that assumes Member States were ‘on their own’ 
when confronted with market panic, as well as for their legal 
novelties, related to the establishment of support mechanisms. Three 
such mechanisms were established,240 one under EU law, one under 
                                                            
235. TFEU art. 130; Protocol on the Statute of the European System of the Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank, art. 7. 
236. Note that the SSM Regulation requires separation between the supervisory and 
monetary functions. SSM Regulation, art. 25, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 85 (EU); see Decision of the 
European Central Bank of 17 September 2014 on the implementation of separation between 
the monetary policy and supervision functions of the European Central Bank, 2014 O.J. (L 
300) 57. 
237. As to the independence, Article 19 echoes the wording of the Treaty provisions on 
monetary-policy related independence, extending this to NCAs as well as the ECB. SSM 
Regulation, art. 19, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 83 (EU). 
238. Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European 
Central Bank on the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and 
oversight over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB within the framework of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (2013/694/EU), 2013 O.J. (L 320) 1. 
239. See generally Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of the European 
Union and the European Central Bank on the cooperation on procedures related to the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, 2013 O.J. (L 320) 1 (EU), available at https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/mou_between_eucouncil_ecb.pdf. 
240. The Greek support facility was partially set apart from these mechanisms and 
involved bilateral lending. 
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the private laws of two Member States, and a third under public 
international law. This Part will discuss each. 
A. European Financial Stability Mechanism 
The use of Union budget funds was channelled through the 
European Financial Stability Mechanism (“EFSM”). It was 
established as a legal entity by Council decision under Article 122(2) 
TFEU.241 The regulation specifies that financial assistance is granted 
‘on the basis of the general economic policy conditions which are 
attached to the Union financial assistance with a view to re-
establishing a sound economic or financial situation in the beneficiary 
Member State and to restoring its capacity to finance itself on the 
financial markets.’242 The troika is in sight as the provision continues 
as follows: ‘these conditions will be defined by the Commission, in 
consultation with the ECB’ and the preamble adds: ‘Its activation will 
be in the context of a joint EU/International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
support.’ 
B. European Financial Stability Fund 
Another facility could use funds raised on the capital markets, to 
be un-lent to a Member State in need. The European Financial 
Stability Fund (“EFSF”) was established as a special purpose vehicle 
under Luxembourg law.243 This is an intergovernmental structure, yet 
makes use of EU institutions in its operations. The EFSF can issue 
bonds (or other debt instruments) on the market to raise funds needed 
to provide loans to euro area states, recapitalise banks, or purchase 
sovereign debt. EFSF borrowing on markets is guaranteed by Member 
States up to specific amounts, in line with their NCB’s subscription to 
the ECB’s capital. The Treaty establishing the EFSF is governed by, 
and to be construed in accordance with, English law.  
                                                            
241. Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European 
financial stabilisation mechanism, 2010 O.J. (L 118) 1. 
242. Regulation 407/2010, art. 3. 
243. For the consolidated version of the Articles of Association, see 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/EFSFStatusCoordonnes%2023AVRL2014.pdf. 
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C. European Stability Mechanism 
A permanent mechanism was finally established: the European 
Stability Mechanism.244 It is a separate legal entity, whose capital is in 
the hands of the Member States of the euro area. The ESM has 
authorised capital of EU€700 billion, of which EU€80 billion is 
issued. The contribution key is based on the NCBs’ capital holdings 
in the ECB. A clear limitation of liability applies. Article 8(5) ESM 
Treaty states: 
‘The liability of each ESM Member shall be limited, in all 
circumstances, to its portion of the authorised capital stock at its 
issue price. No ESM Member shall be liable, by reason of its 
membership, for obligations of the ESM. The obligations of ESM 
Members to contribute to the authorised capital stock in 
accordance with this Treaty are not affected if any such ESM 
Member becomes eligible for, or is receiving, financial assistance 
from ESM.’ 
The establishment of the ESM was preceded by the adoption of a 
TFEU amendment.245 A new paragraph was added to Article 136 
TFEU, reading as follows: 
3. The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a 
stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard 
the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any 
required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made 
subject to strict conditionality. 
Ratification of the ESM Treaty and of the TFEU Treaty 
amendment were the subject of legal proceedings, including before 
the CJEU.246 This brings us to our last set of observations on EMU 
developments: judicial involvement in the crisis response. 
D. Assessment 
Numerous legal issues arise out of the creation of three ‘bail-out’ 
mechanisms, some of which are touched upon in the references to the 
Pringle case in this Article. Suffice it to say here that the ingenuity of 
                                                            
244. For the consolidated version of the ESM Treaty after accession of Lithuania to the 
euro area, see EFSF Framework Agreement, available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/
attachments/20111019_efsf_framework_agreement_en.pdf. 
245. European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member 
States whose currency is the euro, 2011 O.J. (L 91) 1. 
246. Judgment of 27 November 2012 in Case C-370/12 (Pringle). 
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policy-makers to fill the gaps that EMU’s original set-up revealed is 
laudable. Instruments were created that access the markets at 
favourable terms, and on-lend the funds thus borrowed to distressed 
fellow Member States, at strict conditionality, and in tandem with the 
IMF. At the same time, these novelties show the need for more 
comprehensive arrangements. The ESM Treaty was agreed twice, in 
2011 and, again, in 2012, after a change of heart by politicians. Two 
versions of an international agreement in six months’ time, so as to 
allow for progress in thinking.247 Even then, the ESM’s tool kit does 
not include bridge financing, as the new Greek government elected in 
January 2015 found out. This underscores the topicality of the call, in 
2012, by former ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet, for a euro area 
Ministry of Finance to be established.248 Relying on a permanent 
department at EU, or euro area, subject to adequate EU democratic 
control, level would obviate the need to devise ad hoc instruments, 
and successive amendments to an international law treaty to reflect 
evolving political compromises.  
V. JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRISIS RESPONSE 
Until the crisis struck, EMU law was characterised by a low 
level of judicial involvement. Case law on the free movement of 
capital bloomed,249 after many years in which the provisions on 
                                                            
247. The 2012 version includes an array of support mechanisms: next to direct loans, a 
primary and a secondary market facility, a direct recapitalisation instrument and precautionary 
financial assistance, whereas the 2011 version provided for less tools. It took until 8 December 
2014 to adopt the ESM’s Guideline on Financial Assistance for the Direct Recapitalisation of 
Institutions. (Dec. 8, 2014). For all instruments available to the ESM, see: http://www.esm.
europa.eu/about/legal-documents/index.htm  
248. Trichet rhetorically asked his audience: ‘In this Union of tomorrow, or of the day 
after tomorrow, would it be too bold, in the economic field, with a single market, a single 
currency and a single central bank, to envisage a ministry of finance of the Union? Not 
necessarily a ministry of finance that administers a large federal budget. But a ministry of 
finance that would exert direct responsibilities in at least three domains: first, the surveillance 
of both fiscal policies and competitiveness policies, as well as the direct responsibilities 
mentioned earlier as regards countries in a “second stage” inside the euro area; second, all the 
typical responsibilities of the executive branches as regards the union’s integrated financial 
sector, so as to accompany the full integration of financial services; and third, the 
representation of the union confederation in international financial institutions.’ Jean-Claude 
Trichet, Building Europe, Building Institutions: President of the ECB on Receiving the 
Karlspreis 2011 in Aachen, June 2, 2011, available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/
date/2011/html/sp110602.en.html. 
249. Starting with its judgments on the direct effect of the freedom of capital movements 
(judgment of 14 December 1995 in Joint Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94 (Sanz de 
Lera), [1995] ECR I-4821), the CJEU became strongly involved in delineating this freedom 
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capital and payments had only given rise to the odd judgment.250 
Today, judges are called in more frequently. Without discussing the 
merit of these cases, and with no claim to completeness, the following 
overview may shed some light on this aspect of legal developments in 
the area of EMU. 
A. Member States Courts 
Member States courts have been accessed to appraise the 
constitutionality of ratification of the crisis response. Notably the 
German Constitutional Court251 has been active in assessing whether 
the financial assistance funds are in conformity with German 
constitutional law. Its judgments have led to direct involvement of the 
German Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) in agreeing discrete 
steps in the activation of financial assistance. It is this feature of the 
euro area’s constitutional make-up which allegedly has made US 
President Barack Obama remark that governing a single currency 
with (then) seventeen parliaments requires skillful management. The 
Estonian Constitutional Court252 and a Dutch judge253 also had to deal 
with challenges to the ESM Treaty’s ratification.  
Member State courts have also been called in to assess the 
constitutionality of the conditionality attached to the ‘bail-outs.’ 
Notably, the Portuguese Constitutional Court has struck down 
elements of the austerity measures imposed.254 In so far as the 
conditionality had been enshrined not only in MoUs, but also in legal 
acts under Articles 126 and/or 136 TFEU, this judicial involvement 
raises the issue whether a national court is competent to assess the 
                                                                                                                                     
with judgments on golden shares retained by governments after privatisation of companies, on 
tax treatment of non-residents, and on the application of ‘targeted’ financial sanctions against 
individuals and organisations. 
250. See Case 203/80, Casati, [1981] E.C.R. 2595; Joint Cases 286/82 and 26/83, Luisi 
& Carbone, [1984] E.C.R. 377. 
251. Even enumerating the cases related to the crisis response at the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht goes beyond the confines of this article. The German Constitutional 
Court’s website (http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de) contains all judgments. See 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de. 
252. The Estonian Constitutional Court publishes on its website in English, French and 
Russian, next to Estonian. See RIIGIKOHUS, http://www.riigikohus.ee. 
253. President of the District Court of The Hague, 1 June 2012, available at 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BW7242&keywo
rd=esm. 
254. The Portuguese constitutional court’s website is available in English. See 
TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL PORTUGAL, http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/. 
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validity of EU legal acts. Under EU law, this is a competence 
reserved for the CJEU. 
B. Direct Challenges Before the CJEU 
Direct challenges against the ECB have been unsuccessful, thus 
far. The unsuccessful attempts by Herr Städter255 to challenge the 
ECB measures to widen the eligibility criteria of collateral to ensure 
continued use of Greek,256 Irish,257 and Portuguese258 government 
bonds in the monetary policy operations of the Eurosystem were 
already mentioned. Similarly unsuccessful was the challenge, 
instituted in December 2013, by Herr Von Storch and 5216 other 
plaintiffs who opposed the ECB’s announced OMT.259 It was held 
that the OMT needed additional legal instruments and decisions 
subject to the discretion of the ECB to become operative, whereas the 
applicants were not directly concerned in the sense of the fourth 
paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. An action for the annulment of an 
ECB decision taken in the context of the downgrading of Greek 
government debt and the Private Sector Involvement (“PSI”), the 
partial write-down of privately held Greek government debt, was also 
turned down. The latter case260 was initiated by Allessandro Accortini 
and over 200 fellow plaintiffs from Italy who argued that, as holders 
of Greek government bonds, they were disadvantaged by an ECB 
decision that made the eligibility of Greek government bonds for 
                                                            
255. His action for annulment of the ECB’s legal acts was rejected as it was instituted 
after the period of two months from the publication of the legal acts concerned, prescribed in 
the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. 
256. Decision of the European Central Bank of 6 May 2010 on temporary measures 
relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek 
Government (ECB/2010/3), 2010 O.J. (L 117) 102. 
257. Decision of the European Central Bank of 31 March 2011 on temporary measures 
relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Irish 
Government (ECB/2011/4), 2011 O.J. (L 94) 33. 
258. Decision of the European Central Bank of 7 July 2011 on temporary measures 
relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the 
Portuguese Government (ECB/2011/10), 2011 O.J. (L 182) 31. 
259. Case T 492/12, Sven A. von Storch and Others v. ECB, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX 
LEXIS (Dec. 10, 2013). The Order holding the request inadmissible is available in French and 
German only. After the submission of the manuscript, the European Court of Justice dismissed 
the appeal against this Order (Order of the Court in Case C-64/14 P, 30 April 2015). 
260. Case T-224/12, Alessandro Accorinti and Others v. ECB, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 
LEXIS (Apr. 3, 2014). 
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Eurosystem operations conditional upon a credit enhancement.261 The 
Order provides a detailed and highly interesting unfolding story of the 
measures adopted in order to keep the Greek government and 
financial system afloat. It cites a Bloomberg262 news article and refers 
to an unpublished ECB decision.263 The Italian bond holders also 
proceed in a case against the ECB requesting EU€12 million in 
damages.264 They want the Court to establish the ECB’s liability265 for 
the negative impact on their bond holdings of the central bank’s 
transactions which kept it out of the partial write-down of Greek 
privately-held debt.266  
1. Cypriot Cases Against the Commission and the ECB 
In the autumn of 2014, a raft of cases against the ECB relating to 
the conditions for the financial assistance to Cyprus were dismissed as 
either inadmissible or unfounded in law. One such judgment267 
concerned the resolution of Τράπεζα Κύπρου Δημόσια Εταιρεία Λτδi, 
commonly known as the Bank of Cyprus (“BoC”) following a 
Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus of March 25, 2013.268 The plaintiffs 
engaged the Commission and the ECB in proceedings whereas the act 
they attacked emanated from the Eurogroup. The General Court 
                                                            
261. This credit enhancement consisted of a specific guarantee executed by the Greek 
Government in favour of the ECB and the NCBs so as to avoid these members of the 
Eurosystem from undergoing the envisaged debt write-down by Greece. 
262. Bloomberg itself acted against the ECB in different proceedings. These concerned 
the transparency of the ECB’s handling of the Greek crisis. The General Court rejected 
Bloomberg’s request for annulment of the ECB’s decision refusing access to a document on 
the use of derivatives to conceal the seriousness of Greece’s budgetary situation. The Court 
considered that disclosure would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards the 
economic policy of Greece. An appeal against its judgment of 29 November 2012 in Case T-
590/10 (Gabi Thesing and Bloomberg Finance LP v. ECB) was dismissed by Order of 6 
February 2014 (Case C-28/13 P). 
263. ECB/2012/NP6. The numbering indicates that there have been at least six 
unpublished ECB decisions in 2012. 
264. Case T-79/13, Accorinti and Others v. ECB.  
265. TFEU art. 340 (establishing the Union’s liability). 
266. The plaintiffs allege that the ECB concluded a secret bond swap agreement with 
Greece on 15 February 2012, refused to participate in the restructuring of Greek debt imposed 
as part of Greece’s public creditors’ conditionality, where they allege a conflict of interest, 
with the ECB being part of the troika. They also attack the ECB’s decision of 5 March 2012 
which made the eligibility of Greek securities as collateral conditional upon the provision of a 
buy-back scheme in favour of NCBs. 
267. Case T-332/13, Chrysanthi Christodoulou and Stavrinou v. Commission and ECB, 
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS (Oct. 16, 2014). 
268. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/
ecofin/136487.pdf. 
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analyses the status of the Eurogroup and finds that ‘it is not possible 
to consider that the Eurogroup is controlled by the Commission or the 
ECB, nor that that it acts as an agent of such institutions.’ Imputing 
the Eurogroup statement to the ESM is equally rejected; the Court 
considers, in line with paragraph 161 of the Pringle judgment, that the 
Commission and the ECB do not have autonomous decision-making 
powers when acting in the context of the ESM Treaty.269 The 
language of the Eurogroup statement on the restructuring of the 
Cypriot banking sector did not indicate that the restructuring 
measures were part of the conditionality for financial assistance. 
Moreover, the statement does not produce legal effects, which is a 
requirement for an act to be susceptible to Court review. Thus, the 
action of these depositors at Bank of Cyprus was inadmissible. A 
similar outcome concerning a BoC depositor followed the same 
day.270 The General Court came to the same conclusions in respect of 
actions brought by depositors at Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd 
(“Laïki”).271 
Later in the autumn of 2014, the General Court dismissed an 
action against the Commission and the ECB for damage allegedly 
resulting from the signing of the MoU between Cyprus and the ESM. 
This legal act contains conditionality which led to loss of deposits 
held by a company established in Belize that faced a substantial 
reduction in value after the entry into force of a Cypriot decree which 
converted uninsured deposits at the BoC into BoC shares. The Court 
found that ‘the conduct which it is claimed gave rise to the damage 
suffered cannot be imputed to an EU institution’ as the MoU was 
adopted jointly by the ESM and the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, 
the conduct of the Commission consisting in its alleged failure to 
                                                            
269. Case T-332/13 supra note 268, at para. 48 (‘ . . . the duties conferred on the 
Commission and ECB within the ESM Treaty, important as they are, do not entail any power 
to make decisions of their own. Further, the activities pursued by those two institutions within 
the ESM Treaty solely commit the ESM.’). 
270. In Case T-328/13 (Tameio Pronoias Prosopikou Trapezis Kyprou v. European 
Commission and ECB). Appeal pending: Case C-106/15 P. 
271. Orders of the General Court of 16 October 2014 in Case T-331/13 (Marinos 
Nikolaou v. European Commission and ECB), appeal pending: Case C-109/15 P; Case T-
330/13 (Lella Chatziioannou v. European Commission and ECB), appeal pending: Case C-
108/15 P; Case T-329/13 (Petros Chatzithoma and Ellenitsa Chatzithoma v. European 
Commission and ECB), appeal pending: Case C-107/15 P; Case T-327/13 (Konstantinos 
Mallis and Elli Konstantinou Malli v. European Commission and ECB), appeal pending: Case 
C-105/15 P (this is the only judgment to be available in 15 other languages than Greek and 
French, but not (yet?) in English). 
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establish, when signing the MoU, that this was in conformity with EU 
law, notably Article 136(3) TFEU, could not lead to liability since the 
MoU was signed after the reduction in the value of the applicant’s 
deposit at BoC. One of the three conditions272 for liability pursuant to 
Article 340 TFEU, namely the causal link, was not fulfilled. 
2. Pringle Case on ESM 
Most prominent have been the Pringle case before the CJEU on 
the ratification of the ESM Treaty (and the accompanying TFEU 
amendment), and the pending case on the validity of the ECB’s press 
release on OMT. In Pringle, the Court held that financial assistance to 
a Member States is an economic policy measure, so that the adoption 
of a separate ESM Treaty by the Member States does not infringe the 
exclusive competence for monetary policy at EU level.273 Also, the 
economic policy coordination competences of the EU were not 
affected as the ESM was established in the context of the 
strengthening of economic governance (the ‘six-pack’) and its 
functioning supports economic policy prescriptions emanating from 
the Ecofin Council and the Commission pursuant to EU law. 
Furthermore, the ‘no bail-out’ clause of Article 125 TFEU was 
considered not to prevent the granting of financial assistance to a 
Member State provided that this assistance, through the 
accompanying conditionality, supports the objective of this provision. 
The purpose of Article 125 TFEU is to ensure: 
that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market 
when they enter into debt, since that ought to prompt them to 
maintain budgetary discipline. Compliance with such discipline 
contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher objective, 
namely maintaining the financial stability of the monetary 
union.274 
The Court found that financial assistance does not amount to a 
guarantee of a Member State’s outstanding debt, or to taking over 
such debt. The Treaty amendment confirmed a pre-existing 
competence of Member States to enter into a separate agreement to 
establish a permanent mechanism for financial assistance when such 
                                                            
272. The unlawfulness of the conduct, the occurrence of actual damage and the existence 
of a causal link between the conduct and harm alleged. 
273. TFEU art. 3(1)(c). 
274. Paragraph 135 of the judgment in Pringle. 
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support is indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro 
area as a whole and of its Member States. 
3. Gauweiler Case on OMT 
In the reference for a preliminary ruling submitted by the 
German Constitutional Court, the issues are, apart from the tussle 
about supremacy and the ultimate decision on the validity, in 
Germany, of acts adopted by the ECB, even more technical. The 
Gauweiler Case raises matters such as the ECB’s non-preferential 
status and the issuing Member State’s default risk. Also, the 
acceptability of holding sovereign bonds until maturity, and the 
selectivity of purchases of government bonds under an OMT 
programme are among the qualms of the highest German judges. 
They call upon the CJEU to interpret the prohibition of monetary 
financing. Article 123 TFEU does not forbid purchases of government 
bonds on the secondary (contrary to the primary) market but 
shouldn’t the ECB observe a ‘lock-in period’ after primary debt 
issuance during which it abstains from secondary market purchases? 
More fundamentally, the CJEU is asked to rule whether the ECB’s 
requirement of economic policy conditionality for OMT purchases to 
be effected in a specific Member State’s bonds does not overstep the 
dividing line between monetary and economic policy, established by 
the Court in Pringle. In his recent Opinion, Advocate General (“AG”) 
Cruz Villalón275 warned that the ECB’s involvement in economic 
policy setting and monitoring should end in respect of Member States 
whose bonds the ECB would buy under such unconventional 
measures: an end to the troika, so troixit instead of Grexit. After 
scrutinising the, as yet unpublished draft decisions on OMT before 
the Court, the AG suggested the Court that the ECB be required, 
when implementing OMT, to be fully transparent in the reasons 
behind them (motivation requirement) and to respect the 
proportionality principle (the measures are to remain well within the 
limits of the necessary to obtain the stated goal).  
Even the limits of the ECB’s power on saving the single 
currency are called into question by the Bundesverfassungsgericht: it 
asks whether, by announcing the OMT programme and thereby 
keeping the euro area intact, it does not step on the Member States’ 
powers to decide on the geographical scope of the euro area. An 
                                                            
275. In his Opinion issued on 14 January 2015. 
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obvious answer is that the ECB respects the political decision on 
adoption of the euro276 by defending the current composition of the 
Eurozone. The relevant provisions clearly establish the one-way 
transition towards the adoption of the single currency.277 
CONCLUSION  
As this overview of major crisis-response developments shows, 
the crisis has brought about changes in EMU law that are profound 
and wide-ranging. Even this lengthy contribution could not include 
several matters that also deserve attention. Among these: the joint 
oversight by the Commission, under state aid rules, and the ECB, 
acting in its advisory role in respect of draft legislation in its areas of 
competence, of State support measures for banks;278 the effects of the 
Icesave judgment on deposit insurance;279 the waves of banking 
regulations introduced and their effects on the business of banks280 
and on competition from outside the traditional financial sector;281 
and the legality of the Cyprus exchange controls282 which constituted 
the first restrictions on free capital movement in the monetary union.  
                                                            
276. It is submitted that Article 140 TFEU allows the Council to vary an earlier decision 
on the composition of the euro area.  
277. Pursuant to TFEU art. 140(3), the Council is to ‘irrevocably fix the rate at which the 
euro shall be substituted for the currency of the Member State concerned.’ The irreversible 
nature of the single currency was also expressed in the Maastricht Treaty’s Protocol on the 
transition to the third stage of economic and monetary union, cited in footnote 18 above. This 
Protocol, considered superfluous ten years after the introduction of the euro, was repealed by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. 
278. For the Commission’s current approach, see Communication from the Commission 
on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of 
banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’), 2013 O.J. (C 216) 1. 
For the joint efforts by the Commission and the ECB to regulate the governments’ 
interventions in the banking sector, see René Smits, European supervisors in the credit crisis: 
issues of competence and competition in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW: 
THE GLOBAL CRISIS, 305-28 (Mario Giovanoli & Diego Devos eds., 2010) 
279. See generally Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland (European 
Free Trade Assoc. 2013), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/fileadmin/user_upload/Files/
News/2013/16_11_Judgment.pdf. 
280. Where compliance functions are attracting ever more newly recruited bank staff. 
One may question whether this an expression of real change in banking culture or merely 
reflects the need to placate the supervisors. 
281. Think, not only, of banks shedding assets that encumber their capital ratios but, 
also, of Capital Markets Union, a project to stimulate direct financing of SMEs. See generally 
Commission Green Paper on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 63 Final (Feb. 
18, 2015). 
282. For the restrictive measures applicable in Cyprus, see generally CENTRAL BANK OF 
CYPRUS, http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=12583. 
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Further study is warranted of intriguing legal and institutional 
novelties, such as the interplay between Union law and provisions 
adopted outside of this framework, and the role of the institutions in 
these ‘other’ arrangements.283 The announced inclusion of the TSCG 
into the Union’s Treaties will be a testing ground for the ability to 
combine Union law and the necessary flexibility for addressing 
challenges specific to the euro area. A different kind of interplay will 
evolve between the EU (EEA-)284 wide powers of the EBA and the 
ECB’s competences in the euro area.285  
Observers of EMU law will be interested to follow the results of 
the ECB’s declared intention is to limit national exemptions and 
supervisory options,286 thus enhancing the comparability of banks and 
the forging of a common supervisory culture. Banking union implies 
a practical convergence of supervisory practices, forging a common 
European supervisory culture, which will hopefully be formed while 
the banking culture evolves towards more servant and sustainable 
practices. Bringing in a new supranational supervisor provides an 
extraordinary opportunity to break supervisory capture, a 
phenomenon more widely known as ‘regulatory capture.’ Supervisors 
may be prone to speak the language of the supervised, to such an 
extent as to no longer observe an adequate distance for effective 
oversight. Supervisors may even come to understand the needs of the 
supervised to the detriment of the needs of society at large which they 
are to serve.287 As newly entrusted supervisory institution, the ECB is 
uniquely placed to break with this legacy. 
                                                            
283. The ‘Fiscal Compact’ Treaty, the ESM, the Single Resolution Fund. 
284. The internal market extends beyond the EU to include Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein, three non-member countries with which the EU forms the European Economic 
Area (EEA). See generally EFTA, http://www.efta.int/legal-texts. 
285. Not to mention the possibility that Member States outside the euro area may join 
the SSM under the ‘close cooperation’ of Article 7 SSM Regulation. See SSM Regulation, art. 
7, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 63 (EU). 
286. Caroline Binham & Martin Arnold, Europe’s Big Banks Will Need to Raise Capital 
Warns ECB, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015). The FT reports as follows: [Chair of the 
ECB’s Supervisory Board] ‘Danièle Nouy told the Financial Times that banks would have to 
raise more and better quality capital as a result of her new agency’s drive to harmonise more 
than 150 national variances in capital rules. Fresh legislation from Brussels is likely to also be 
needed, she added.’ 
287. The preamble to the SSM Regulation acknowledges that national supervision has 
not always been serving societal interests where it states, in recitals 12 and 83, that credit 
institutions should be subject to ‘supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non-
prudential considerations.’ See SSM Regulation, arts. 12 & 83, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 64, 72 (EU). 
1190 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1135 
Materially, the direction into which economic governance may 
best go would be towards a single economic policy for the euro area. 
Introducing a euro area Treasury, responsible for joint debt issuance 
and a separate budget, limited but adequate for automatic stabilisers 
to work at the level of monetary union; and more frequent use of 
Article 122(1) TFEU, should, in my view, be beacons. Unified 
external representation, long on the agenda and, strictly speaking, 
mandatory under EU law288 should also be pursued. Further down the 
line, replacing the tutelage under Regulation 472/2013 with a 
mechanism of strict federal oversight that permits restructuring of 
public debt of a Member State—an orderly ‘sovereign insolvency’ 
arrangement289—may be worthwhile considering. 
The transparency of economic governance arrangements leaves a 
lot to be desired. Even with consolidated versions of the amended 
SGP regulations, the byzantine rules and practices put off serious 
interest from others than civil servants in a core issue of democracy: 
the budget. Clear rules, the compliance with which can 
independently290 be ascertained, are necessary for a sound public 
debate in a democracy. The increased transparency on both the 
monetary and the supervisory front will open the doors for debate on 
the policies pursued and may lead to further legal challenges. The 
experience thus far shows that courts may not be the most suitable 
places to determine the outcome of the policy debate. Proceedings 
against crisis measures have not met with much success thus far, with 
the notable exception of Portugal where the Constitutional Court has 
prevented some excesses of austerity. ‘Judicialisation’ of monetary 
policy should be avoided, yet protection against governments that 
impose hardship and, perhaps, act unlawfully, is much needed.  
New winds blowing in the political arena of various Member 
States may undermine consensus on the policy direction, and force 
the policy-makers to acknowledge the human cost of conditionality. 
The technical nature of the issues should not make us overlook their 
ethical aspects. Nor should ‘silo thinking’ keep us within the confines 
                                                            
288. See TFEU arts. 138 & 219; the case law on external representation of the Union in 
areas of internal competence. 
289. In the area of corporate insolvency, the EU might consider studying true 
harmonisation of winding-up proceedings for financial firms The BRRD, with its deference to 
the outcome of national insolvency procedures (no creditor worse off principle) does not yet 
reach this level of harmonisation. 
290. Independently from the Commission and from the independent agencies for 
budgetary and general economic forecasting. 
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of traditional dividing lines. Why is it that the various crises Europe is 
faced with haven’t yet been addressed in a coherent fashion? Is it too 
far-fetched to link the energy union291 with EMU-related efforts to 
stimulate the economy of ‘peripheral’ Member States?  
More examples can be found where ‘lateral thinking’ would help 
us further. Relevant though law is, it is beyond the area of law where 
we should look for solutions. This Author submits that the cultural 
element of the crisis, and of European integration, has too often been 
neglected. Here, issues that can only be addressed over a long time 
horizon, such as the absence of a common media space, and of a 
shared (second) language, play a major role. But, just as in debt 
reduction—which will relieve our grandchildren from the fiscal 
burden we may leave—the long-term should not be overlooked, 
whatever the tenacity of the trouble. The euro, meant to crown and 
further European integration has proven divisive instead of inclusive, 
with hardening attitudes across the Union against neighbours in need. 
If lessons taken home from the crisis remind us of the value of the 
European project, of the need to stand firmly together in the face of 
major adversity, and of the imperative to widen our perspective on 
what constitutes good-neighbourliness, the complications of the past 
years will have not been in vain.  
 
                                                            
291. See generally A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-
Looking Climate Change Policy, COM(2015) 80 Final, (Feb. 25, 2015). 
